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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, / 
Plaintiff/Respondent / Case No. 980169-CA 
vs. / 
MICHAEL RENE DITTMER, / 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. / 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a final order and judgment finding 
Appellant guilty of one count of burglary, a Third Degree Felony, 
in violation of U.C.A. Section 76-6-202 (1953, as amended); theft, 
a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 76-6-404 (U.C.A., as 
amended); possession of a controlled substance, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, in violation of U.C.A. 58-36-8 (U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended) ; and violation of a drug paraphernalia act, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, in violation of U.C.A. 58-37-A-5(l) (U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended) and sentencing Appellant to serve an undeterminent term 
not to exceed five years at the Utah State Prison on the felony 
count and terms of 180 days on each misdemeanor count, to run 
concurrent with each other. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-29-312(e) (1996). Appellant's 
conviction was entered by Judge Baldwin on February 19, 1998. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the defense attorney deny Appellant's right to 
effective assistance of counsel? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The Appellate Court must decide if the trial record is 
adequate to permit decision of the issue and if the Defendant is 
represented by counsel other than trial counsel. Further, where 
ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on 
appeal, the Appellate Court must determine, as a matter of law, 
whether the Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. 
State v. Callahan, 826 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1993). Appellant must 
establish: 
(a) His counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall 
below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
(b) But for his counsel's deficient performance, there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have 
been different. Defense counsel's failure cannot be deemed trial 
strategy, in that there was no possible benefit for Appellant from 
his failures. State v. Hovator, 914 P.2d 37 (Utah, 1996). 
(c) That the jury was encouraged to speculate that items 
represented in the photographs were stolen or the product of 
Appellant's burglaries when in fact, Appellant was only charged 
with theft of a couch and a day planner. 
(d) That defense counsel failed to object to the State's 
cross examination of Appellant as being beyond the scope of direct 
and in violation of Rule 104 (d) Utah Rules of Evidence and that was 
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prejudicial to Defendant's case. 
(e) That defense counsel was ineffective when he failed to 
object to the State's improperly presented and unsupported innuendo 
in his opening statement and through witnesses, which provided the 
jury a basis to impute criminal intent and actions to Defendant 
which were not supported by any testimony in regard to property 
with which Defendant was not charged, i.e. improper statements by 
the State concerning property in Defendant's possession with which 
he was not charged with theft or any other crime. The State failed 
to support prejudicial, inculpatory inferences arising from its 
opening statement and examination of witnesses with appropriate 
evidence. 
(f) The standard of review as to the officer's reasonable 
suspicion and illegal detention of Appellant is two-fold. (1) Was 
the police officer's actions justified at its inception and (2) was 
the resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first place? 
(g) The standard of review with regards to the admissibility 
of the evidence of third party culpability, pursuant to Wigmore on 
Evidence (1A Wigmore, Evidence (Tillers rev. ed. 1980) Section 139, 
P. 1724), is that if the evidence is of no appreciable value, no 
harm is done in admitting it; but if the evidence is in truth 
calculated to cause the jury to doubt, the Court should not attempt 
to decide for the jury that this doubt is purely speculative and 
fantastic, but should afford the accused every opportunity to 
create that doubt. 
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2. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Was the State's action when it improperly brought Appellant's 
pre-Miranda statements and silence to the attention of the jury 
during his opening statement and examination of witnesses 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
Standard of Review: The standard concerning prosecutorial 
misconduct is whether prosecutor's statements constitute error and 
were improper because the remarks called to the juror's attention 
matters which they would not be justified in considering and in 
reaching a verdict and were these remarks harmful, and should these 
remarks have been an error that should have been obvious to the 
trial Court? 
(a) Did the prosecutor commit prosecutorial misconduct by 
presenting (admitting) pre-Miranda statements and pre-Miranda 
silence to establish the identification and theft of items with 
which the Appellant was not charged. The standard of review of 
questions with regards to reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle 
and detain is for corrections. State v. Rodriguez, 338 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 19, Utah Court of Appeal, March 3, 1998; and 
(b) Did prosecution commit reversible error by the use of 
hearsay testimony to introduce unsupported innuendo to the jury in 
his opening remarks and through witness testimony, which provided 
the jury a basis to imply intent and actions of the Appellant 
(which were not supported by the facts) with regard to property 
with which Appellant was not charged. 
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PRESENTATION OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant argues that his trial counsel acted so deficiently 
as to deny him a fair trial and but for the deficiency, the outcome 
of the trial would have been different. 
In addition, Appellant was faced with prosecutorial misconduct 
which violated his due process rights under the Constitution of the 
U.S. and the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Constitutional Amendment IV provides that in all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of this State and District 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which District shall 
have been previously ascertained by law and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor and to have the assistance of counsel for 
his defense. (emphasis added) 
U.S. Constitutional Amendment VI in U.S. Constitutional 
Amendment XIV, Section 1 provides all persons born or naturalized 
in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunity for the citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law, nor deny any person within its 
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws. (emphasis added) 
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Utah Constitution Art. 1, Section 7 provides that no person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Utah Constitution Art. 1, Section 12 provides that in criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him; to have a copy thereof; to testify on his 
own behalf; to be confronted by the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf; have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights therein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a 
husband against his wife, nor shall any person be put twice in 
jeopardy for the same offense. (emphasis added) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged with burglary, theft, possession of 
a controlled substance and violation of the drug paraphernalia act 
and was convicted on all four counts. (R. 1-4) Defense counsel 
failed to adequately investigate and prepare a defense on all four 
charges. He failed to investigate recent burglaries by third 
parties of the storage units which Appellant was charged with 
burglarizing. He failed to file and/or argue suppression motions 
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concerning in custody statements made by the Appellant and repeated 
to the jury in reference to a camper shell and miscellaneous 
property with which Appellant was not charged and as to drugs and 
paraphernal. He failed to object to a witness' competence to 
testify concerning practices and procedures with regards to the 
storage company's activities and with regards to witness' 
inconsistent statements. He closed the defense without permission 
of his client and without having called any witnesses or making any 
opening statement whatsoever, which required the Appellant to take 
the stand in his own defense after asking the Court if he, in fact, 
could put on a defense. He failed to object to the foundation for 
photographs which were entered into evidence and contained 
prejudicial information concerning apparently stolen property with 
which the Appellant was not charged. He failed to produce 
witnesses in the defenses behalf. He failed to object to the 
State's cross-examination of the Appellant to such questions that 
were clearly beyond the scope of direct examination. He failed to 
object to the presentation by the State of unsupported innuendo in 
opening arguments and in examination of witnesses. He failed to 
object and/or agree that the officers at the scene had no 
reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant's activities or search his 
truck, and that the detention was not reasonable in scope as it 
related to the circumstances of this case. In addition, defense 
counsel failed to investigate the case to discover evidence of 
third party culpability as to the prior burglaries of the storage 
units, whether anyone was under investigation for those crimes and 
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more importantly, was the modis operandi the same or similar to 
acts of behavior of Appellant. 
The prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by admitting 
pre-Miranda statements and pre-Miranda silence and by establishing 
the identification and theft of items with which the Appellant was 
not charged by the use of hearsay testimony only and by presenting 
unsupported innuendo in his opening remarks and through the 
witnesses who were called to testify, which provided the jury a 
basis to impute intent and actions of the Appellant that were not 
supported by any testimony with regards to property with which the 
Appellant was not charged. The State failed to support prejudicial 
and inculpatory inferences arising from his opening arguments and 
posed questions to witnesses and presented pictures and other 
evidence of possible crimes with which Appellant was not charged. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 9:00 a.m. on March 29, 1997, Appellant rented 
a storage unit located at 1701 West Riverdale Road in Roy, Utah, 
commonly known as Mollerup's Storage. (R. 128-155) Appellant had 
lost his apartment and was in the process of moving his personal 
property into a unit during that day. (R. 128-142) At about 10:00 
a.m., Appellant had occasion to visit a friend by the name of 
Robert Amador at Amador's residence. (R. 128-145) After a few 
hours, Appellant left Amador's residence and returned again about 
3:00 p.m. (R. 128-156) The record does not disclose whether 
Appellant was making additional moving trips to the storage unit 
during his absence from Amador's home, but apparently he left and 
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returned again. (R. 128-157 and 158) 
At approximately 6:00 p.m. on the same day, Amador and 
Appellant returned to the storage unit. (R. 128-157) Appellant 
was delivering a load of property to his unit, but he needed to 
sort out what he wanted to keep and what he wanted to take to the 
swap meet. (R. 128-142) As a result, he said he unloaded much of 
this property from his truck. (R. 128-142) During this process, 
Appellant and Amador discovered papers and property laying about 
and inside some of the open storage units. (R. 128-143, 144 and 
159) Appellant thought that this property had been abandoned and 
would be taken to the dump or was otherwise left behind by the 
owners. (R. 128-152) Amador and Appellant proceeded to go through 
the property that they had found to determine which items, if any, 
could be sold at the swap meet. (R. 128-145) The two men found 
such items as empty boxes, papers, motorcycle parts, printers, 
(R. 128-144) , and in one open unit they found a broken washing 
machine which appeared to have been abandoned. (R. 128-143) 
Appellant moved this machine into his unit hoping that it could be 
restored. (R. 128-143) 
Amador and Appellant also came across a couch and a few boxes 
of personal property that Appellant had noticed during his visit to 
the storage units earlier that day. Appellant told Amador that if 
he did not want the couch, Appellant would take it to the swap meet 
and sell it. (R. 128-144) 
Solomon Le Doux arrived at Mollerup's to check on his two 
rental units at approximately 6:00 p.m. that evening. (R. 128-4 
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and 5) As he approached his units to check his property, he saw 
two men who he later identified as Appellant and Amador, who he 
described to police as "suspicious". (R. 128-4) Mr. Le Doux 
stated that he observed the Appellant removing items from storage 
units and putting them into a greenish truck. (R. 128-5) This 
witness testified that he did not see either man break into any 
storage unit. (R. 128-6) In fact, Mr. Le Doux testified that the 
units were not even locked. (R. 128-9) Further, he testified that 
he had observed the men for at least 15 minutes prior to the 
arrival of the police. (R. 128-13) Mr. Le Doux went on to testify 
that his units had been burglarized about a week prior to March 29, 
1997. (R. 128-6) Indeed, Detective Bryson of the Roy Police 
Department later testified that there had been recent burglaries of 
the units at that location. (R. 128-131) Neither the state nor 
defense counsel bothered to verify this information to determine 
whether or not someone else had recently committed burglaries on 
the units in question and that they then had been abandoned, and 
Appellant was just sifting through the rubble. This could have 
left an impression with the jury that Defendant had committed those 
prior burglaries which was not a fact in evidence. 
Mr. Le Doux contacted police and according to Officer 
Hackworth of the Roy City Police Department, Hackworth arrived at 
the scene at about 6:00 p.m. that evening. Hackworth was in 
uniform and driving a marked police car. (R. 128-18) Mr. Le Doux 
talked with Hackworth about what he had observed and Hackworth 
began questioning Appellant and Amador concerning their activities. 
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Appellant remained silent during most of this questioning, but 
Amador, with Appellant present, did volunteer some information, 
which was presented to the jury during Appellant's trial on the 
matter. Appellant's silence during this questioning was made clear 
to the jury by the State during State's opening statement 
(R. 129-7) and the trial. (R. 128-26, 31, 32 and 33) Amador was 
not present at the trial, nor did he testify. Hackworth made it 
clear to both men that they were not free to leave the scene and 
escorted them from inside the building out into the light. 
(R. 128-28 and 29) About this time, Hackworth called for back up 
and Officer Stevens of the Roy City Police Department arrived at 
the scene, also in uniform and driving a marked police car. 
(R. 128-34) Shortly thereafter, Hackworth discovered that 
Appellant had given false information concerning his name and date 
of birth. (R. 128-34) If Appellant was not free to leave the 
scene before Hackworth received this information, there should be 
little doubt that he would not be free to leave after giving*false 
information to a police officer. Hackworth had probable cause to 
arrest at that time and Appellant was "in custody". 
At approximately 6:30 p.m., Detective Bryson of the Roy City 
Police Department arrived at the scene. At this time, there were 
at least three police officers at the scene. Also present were Mr. 
Le Doux, who had admitted Stevens to Mollerup's through the 
security gate (R. 128-76), and the manager of Mollerup Storage (R. 
128-126) Clearly, Appellant was surrounded. Bryson had been 
contacted to report to the scene shortly after Hackworth determined 
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Appellant's true identity. (R. 128-38 and 121) 
Prior to Bryson's arrival and prior to any spoken arrest, 
Stevens contacted Nicole Ayers, a renter of one of the units at the 
scene. He requested that she appear at the scene to identify any 
personal property that may have belonged to her. (R. 128-42) She 
identified a couch on the Appellant's truck and a day planner that 
were hers. She testified that her shed had been locked and the 
items were not abandoned. Appellant's storage shed was in a 
different area than hers. After her identification of several 
items, Appellant and Amador were placed under formal arrest by 
Stevens. Appellant was not informed of his Miranda rights by 
anyone while he was at the scene. In fact, he was not informed of 
his Miranda rights until after he had been transported to the 
office of Detective Bryson for a personal interview at the Roy 
jail. (R. 128-123) 
It is unclear from the record when Appellant agreed to allow 
the officers to enter and search his unit. From the transcript of 
Hackworth's testimony, a person arrived at the scene looking for a 
camper shell which matched the description of the one police said 
was described by Appellant (R. 128-38) Defendant's attorney did 
not attempt to exclude this testimony because Appellant was in 
custody and had not been given his Miranda warnings. He was 
surrounded by uniformed police and on lookers. Further, 
information received from Talbot, the alleged owner of the shell, 
was not objected to. Talbot did not appear or testify at 
Appellant's trial. 
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According to Hackworth, Stevens opened the truck after 
Appellant's consent. (R. 128-40) The officers testified that they 
retrieved just enough information from the contents of the truck to 
notify Nicole Ayers to report to the scene. (R. 128-40) With her 
alleged identification, a formal arrest was made 3 0 to 45 minutes 
after the officers entered the truck. (R. 128-42) Before this 
time, the officers searched and interrogated Appellant under the 
auspices of consent. (R. 128-34, 39, 40) 
Incident to an "inventory search" of Appellant's truck, 
Stevens found what the state has referred to as a "hype kit" 
containing a small spoon and film canisters. (R. 128-95) Stevens 
interrogated Appellant about this item and Appellant stated that it 
was his and that he was a drug user. Still, Appellant had not been 
informed of his Miranda rights. (R. 128-44) The State did not 
assert that this "hype kit" contained any illegal substances. The 
officers also recovered a small amount of marijuana in Appellant's 
pocket. At Detective Bryson's office, at least an hour after 
Bryson arrived at the scene, Appellant was read his Miranda rights 
from a card, but nothing during Detective Bryson's interview with 
Appellant had much to do with drugs or stolen property. The 
interview revolved around a washing machine that was not part of 
the state's case and was not connected to any of the charges 
brought against Appellant. Appellant waived his rights to Bryson 
and consented to speak with her, but by then, the officers had 
already received enough evidence from Appellant that Bryson did not 
need to discuss any of the charges, only the washing machine, which 
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was not related to theft charges. (R. 128-123-129) 
Both Hackworth and Stevens were allowed to present Appellant's 
statements concerning the "hype kit" to the jury during Appellant's 
trial. (R. 128- 44 and 95) The defense failed to file a 
suppression motion or to even make an oral argument concerning the 
inadmissibility of Appellant's statements made after Appellant was 
placed in custody and after his arrest, but before Miranda rights 
were given. 
Appellant was convicted on all four charges and subsequently 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
(a) Defendant's attorney failed to investigate persons 
charged with recent burglaries of Mollerup's Storage. 
(b) Defense attorney failed to file and/or argue suppression 
motions concerning in custody statements made by Defendant and 
repeated to the jury in reference to the camper shell, couch and 
miscellaneous property with which Appellant was not charged. 
(c) Defense counsel failed to object to Le Doux's competence 
to testify concerning practices and procedures with regards to 
storage company policies and with regards to witnesses' 
inconsistent statements. 
(d) Defendant's attorney closed the defense without calling 
any witnesses or consultation with his client which forced 
Appellant to ask the Court if he could testify to at least put on 
some defense. As a result, Appellant was forced to testify in 
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violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
incorporated into the 14th Amendment and thereby made applicable to 
the State. 
(e) Defense counsel failed to demand a foundation before the 
Court improperly admitted photos into evidence of items with which 
Appellant was not charged that were highly prejudicial and allowed 
the jury to speculate that these items represented in the photos 
were stolen by Appellant when in fact, Appellant was only charged 
with theft of a couch and day planner. 
(f) Defense counsel failed to produce witnesses such as 
Talbot. Police said they knew she would, from time to time, go 
through open units and collect property. 
(g) Defense counsel failed to object to state's cross 
examination of Appellant, which went beyond scope of direct 
examination. 
(h) Defense counsel failed to object to the State's 
improperly presented and unsupported innuendo in his opening 
statement and through witnesses, which provided the jury a basis to 
impute intent and actions to Defendant that were not supported by 
any testimony with regards to property with which Defendant was not 
charged, i.e. improper statements by the State concerning property 
in Defendant's possession with which he was not charged with theft 
or any other crime. The State failed to support prejudicial, 
inculpatory inferences arising from his opening statement and 
examination of witnesses with appropriate evidence. 
(i) Defense counsel failed to argue that the officers at the 
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scene had no reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant's activities 
and search his truck and that the detention was not reasonable in 
scope as it related to the circumstances of the case. 
(j) Defense counsel failed to introduce any evidence of third 
party culpability concerning prior burglaries of the storage unit, 
the identification of prior criminal activity and by whom, together 
with the fact that Appellant had no burglary tools, but were other 
tools found or people charged in prior burglary. 
2. Prosecutorial Misconduct. 
(a) The State improperly brought Appellant's pre-Miranda 
statements and silence to the attention of the jury during his 
opening statement and examination of witnesses. 
(b) The State produced evidence of the theft of a camper 
shell with which Appellant was not charged and brought this 
information to the jury by way of hearsay. The State established 
evidence of theft of camper shell by hearsay. 
(c) The State improperly presented unsupported innuendo in 
his opening statement and through witnesses, which provided the 
jury a basis to impute intent and actions to Defendant that were 
not supported by any testimony with regards to property with which 
Defendant was not charged, i.e. improper statements by the State 
concerning property in Defendant's possession even though he was 
not charged with theft of those items. The State failed to support 
prejudicial, inculpatory inferences arising from his opening 
statement and examination of witnesses' questions with appropriate 
evidence. 
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First, the State introduced testimony, without objection from 
defense counsel, through Mr. Le Doux's testimony, as to the 
practices and procedures of the storage unit management. Mr. Le 
Doux had nothing to do with the management or rental of the units 
at Mollerup's, but only maintained two rental units at the 
facility. He testified that he was aware of the management policy 
and procedures used when tenants failed to pay their rent in a 
timely manner (R. 128-8), but went on to admit that his knowledge 
came from the fact that his storage units were sealed by Mollerup 
because he was delinquent in his rental payments and that he could 
not gain access to those units as a result thereof. (R. 128-9) 
Mr. Le Doux also testified that his units had been burglarized a 
week or so prior to March 29, 1997. 
Defense counsel failed to adequately cross examine Le Doux as 
to his inconsistent statements. It was imperative that defense 
counsel question Le Doux's competency to testify as to Mollerup's 
procedures. The jury should have been made aware of the fact that 
it appeared that Le Doux was locked out of his own rental units, 
but justified his presence at the scene by stating that he, in 
fact, got into his units to insure the safety of his property on 
March 29, 1997. (R. 128-13) Further, defense counsel failed to 
object to the absolute lack of foundation as to the witness' 
personal knowledge of management practices and procedures dealing 
with other tenants; reasons why storage units may have been left 
open and policies and practices with regards to Mollerup's dealings 
with abandoned property. Neither the State nor defense counsel 
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introduced any evidence concerning these things, even though the 
manager of the facility was present on March 29, 1997 when the 
police were at the scene and even though Detective Bryson knew the 
manager's identity. (R. 128-126) 
In addition, while Mr. Le Doux observed Appellant for about 15 
minutes prior to the arrival of the police, during which time 
Appellant went on with his business, defense counsel failed to 
object to Le Doux's speculation that Appellant had no reason to pay 
attention to him. (R. 128-13) Defense counsel failed to inquire 
as to the location of the witness and whether Appellant appeared to 
know he was there and watching. The argument should have been made 
that if Appellant was aware of the witness' observations, and 
continued his activity, it is reasonable that Appellant felt his 
activities innocent and therefore made no effort to hide them. 
Not only did defense counsel fail to adequately cross examine 
witnesses as above described, but he failed to put on a defense, 
beginning with his waiver of any opening statement. (R. 128-138) 
He then closed his case without conferring with Appellant. 
Appellant had to ask the Court to reopen the Defendant's case to 
let him testify in order to put on any defense whatsoever. 
(R. 128-140) 
There are several instances in the record that required 
defense counsel to take note and investigate. The first instance 
was the mention of an individual present at the storage units when 
Le Doux arrived, apparently a lady that rents next to him, was 
never located or questioned. (R. 128-15) Nothing more is 
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mentioned of this mystery lady and no one knows if she saw anyone 
actually breaking into any of the units the day in question. 
The second instance was the mention of Lynnette Talbot, the 
mystery woman who appeared out of no where to identify a "shell" as 
belonging to her that was located in Appellant's storage unit. 
(R. 128-82). Ms. Talbot was not present at trial, nor did she 
testify. However, testimony of her identification and proof of 
ownership of alleged stolen property with which Appellant was not 
charged, was received into evidence without any objection from 
defense counsel. Officer Hackworth testified that Talbot claimed 
ownership of the camper shell. (R. 128-51) This was clearly a 
verbal statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted and 
was therefore inadmissible hearsay. Yet, defense counsel made no 
attempt to object to or have that testimony stricken. Hackworth 
admitted that this information was not in his police report, and 
still defense counsel made no objection and still no Ms. Talbot at 
trial. (R. 128-51) Further, by the time the police said that 
Appellant consented to the opening of his storage unit so that Ms. 
Talbot could identify her shell, Appellant was in custody and had 
not been advised of his Miranda rights. Still defense counsel did 
not object. It seems clear that the officers and the State were 
using hearsay statements and conjecture and presenting them to the 
jury to develop their case. The officers had Appellant in custody 
and failed to read him his Miranda rights apparently so he would 
incriminate himself with information sufficient to convict. (R. 
128-34, 35) The record is clear that even Detective Bryson had 
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arrived at the scene prior to finding the shell. (R. 128-84) 
Appellant was surrounded by uniformed police with no opportunity to 
leave the scene or ask for counsel, clearly he was in custody. 
The third instance where defense counsel failed to take note 
and investigate concerns the photographs that were introduced and 
received into evidence. These photographs depict various kinds of 
property at various locations. The State failed to provide any 
foundation for the admittance of these pictures and defense failed 
to demand one. There is nothing in the record to suggest who took 
the pictures, when they were taken and where. Without a proper 
foundation before introduction of the photos, there is no way to 
determine if they were true representations of evidence that the 
state admitted through testimony of its witnesses. Pursuant to the 
very definition of "laying a foundation", the photos were 
inadmissible without it. Besides, Defendant was not charged with 
the theft of any thing besides the couch and day planner. The 
pictures were prejudicial. The pictures represented a considerable 
amount of personal property with which Appellant was not charged. 
Again, defense counsel made no objection or even mentioned that a 
foundation was needed concerning the photos. 
The fourth instance is when defense counsel failed to take 
note and investigate concerning the statements that were made by 
police officers that they did not see evidence of a break in on the 
evening of March 29, 1997. (R. 128-89) This was not questioned by 
defense counsel. However, it was incumbent on defense counsel to 
investigate the reports of the recent burglaries at that location 
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by others. In addition, there were no instruments of burglary 
found anywhere near the scene or about person or property of the 
Appellant. (R. 128-98) There were no cut or broken padlocks on 
Appellant in or by his truck or in the area. In fact, there is no 
evidence in the record that Appellant committed burglary at all. 
The jury was allowed to assume that because Appellant was in 
possession of items that had been in storage units some days prior 
to March 29th, he must have committed burglary and theft. This 
allowance was a direct result of defense counsel's failure to put 
forth an adequate defense and bring critical information to the 
jury concerning the recent burglaries and the fact that Appellant 
was charged with theft of only the shell and the couch. Defense 
counsel also failed to investigate evidence of third party 
culpability. 
Another example of defense counsel's failure to adequately 
represent Appellant is the testimony of Bryson concerning a washing 
machine, which was not in evidence and not part of the State's 
case. Admittance of this evidence was prejudicial error. 
(R. 128-127 and 129) Although defense counsel argued relevance to 
the Court, he should have argued that the prosecutor failed to 
support prejudicial, inculpatory inferences arising from his 
questions with appropriate evidence. Bryson's interview concerning 
the washing machine and Appellant's statement to Bryson that "he 
knew it was wrong to take it and that he should return it," 
(R. 128-129 and 93), brought improper information to the juror's 
attention. The state did not put on any evidence that the 
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Appellant had committed a crime with regards to the washing machine 
and piles of other personal property. The introduction of this 
testimony was prejudicial, especially in conjunction with the many 
other errors in the case. Again defense counsel failed to provide 
an adequate defense when he failed to present Ms. Talbot as a 
witness on Appellant's behalf. Detective Bryson was aware that 
Talbot used to go to the same storage units and clean out abandoned 
units. (R. 128-130) 
The fifth instance where defense counsel failed to adequately 
take note and investigate is when he allowed the police officers to 
testify about admissions made by Appellant concerning the drugs in 
his pocket and the alleged paraphernalia after Appellant had been 
arrested, but before he was instructed as to his rights under 
Miranda. (R. 128-44, 94) This should be a subjective test on the 
officer's knowledge. Where officers knew by that time that they 
were holding Appellant for giving false information to a police 
officer and still did not advise him of his Miranda rights, it was 
error not to object. By the time Appellant was read his Miranda 
rights at the police station, he had totally incriminated himself. 
The drug charges were clearly inflammatory to the jury on the theft 
and burglary charges. 
Finally, the sixth instance that defense counsel failed to 
take note and investigate and adequately defend Appellant is when 
there was no objection to the state's cross examination of 
Appellant concerning paraphernalia and drugs when those subjects 
were not mentioned at all during Appellant's direct testimony. (R. 
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128-152) Defense counsel failed to object to the questions as 
beyond the scope of direct and a violation of not only Appellant's 
Fifth Amendment rights, but due process as well. It even appears 
from the transcript that defense counsel may have stipulated to the 
fact that his client was. guilty of possession and paraphernalia, 
even though the "hype kit" contained no syringe, needles or illegal 
substance (R. 128-152 and 154) 
STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT 
Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution 
guarantee all persons charged with a criminal offense the right to 
effective assistance of counsel. Despite this constitutionally 
mandated right, the Appellant was denied effective assistance of 
counsel, wherein his attorney: 
(a) Defendant's attorney failed to investigate the police's 
knowledge of recent burglaries of Mollerup's Storage and evidence 
of third party culpability. 
(b) Failed to file and/or argue suppression motions 
concerning "in custody" statements made by Defendant and repeated 
to the jury in reference to the shell, couch and property with 
which Appellant was not charged, and drugs and paraphernalia. 
(c) Failed to object to Le Doux's competence to testify 
concerning practices and procedures with regards to storage company 
activities and with regards to witnesses' inconsistent statements. 
(d) Defendant's attorney closed Appellant's defense without 
any witnesses and Defendant had to ask the Court if he could 
testify as he was the only one present which violate^ his Fifth 
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Amendment right to remain silence. 
(e) Failed to demand a foundation before photos were entered 
as evidence; they contained items with which Defendant was not 
charged and were prejudicial. 
(f) Failed to produce witnesses such as Talbot. Police said 
they knew she would, from time to time, go through open units and 
collect property. 
(g) Failed to object to State's cross-examination of 
Appellant as beyond scope of direct examine. 
(h) Failed to object to the State's presentation of innuendo 
which statements were never supported by any evidence. 
The State committed prosecutorial misconduct: 
(a) By putting Appellant's pre-Miranda statements and silence 
before the jury. 
(b) Establishing evidence of theft of camper shell by hearsay 
even though Appellant was never charged with this theft. 
(c) Presenting unsupported innuendo in opening and through 
witnesses, which provided the jury a basis to impute intent and 
actions to Defendant that were not supported by any testimony or 
evidence with regards to property with which Defendant is not 
charged, i.e. improper statements by the state concerning property 
in Defendant's possession with which he was not charged with theft 
or any other crime. The State failed to support prejudicial, 
inculpatory inferences arising from his questions with appropriate 
evidence. 
The trial counsel's omissions were prejudicial by his failure 
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to present a defense and failure to object to prejudicial 
information that was admitted into evidence by the State. These, 
by themselves, were prejudicial and but for the defense counsel's 
ineffective assistance, the outcome of the Appellant's trial would 
have been different. In addition, if the prosecutor had not 
committed prosecutorial misconduct, the jury's attention would not 
have been called to matters which would not be justifiably 
considered in reaching a verdict. These improper statements 
require reversal because they should be determined as harmful. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE 1 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
To demonstrate ineffective representation, a 
Defendant must establish (1) his counsel's 
performance was so deficient as to fall below 
an objective standard of reasonableness and 
(2) but for his counsel's deficient 
performance, there is a reasonable probability 
that the outcome of the trial would be 
different. State v. Hovator, 914 P.2d 37 
(Utah 1996); Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 
668, 688, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 
2052 (1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 
"186-87 (Utah 1990). "A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Tempiin 805 P.2d 
at 187 (quoting Strickland, 466 US AT 694) . 
"The determination of whether difficult 
performance affected the outcome of the trial 
must be made by considering the totality of 
the evidence [and] taking into account the 
entire evidentiary pictures or have an 
isolated effect and how strongly the verdict 
is supported by the record." Id; Hovator, 914 
P.2d at 38. 
A. DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO INVESTIGATE RECENT BURGLARIES 
AT MOLLERUP#S STORAGE. 
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The State, through testimony of Mr. Le Doux (R. 128-6) and 
Detective Bryson (R. 128-131) brought forward evidence that 
Mollerup's Storage facility had been recently burglarized. In 
fact, Le Doux stated that his units had been burglarized as 
recently as a week or so prior to Appellant's arrest. In light of 
the fact the Le Doux, the individual who called the police and 
observed Appellant's behavior for at least fifteen minutes, did not 
see Appellant or his friend break into any unit (R. 128-6) and in 
fact, Le Doux testified that the units were not even locked, 
(R. 128-9) and in light of the fact that police officers testified 
that they did not see any evidence of a break in on the evening of 
March 29, 1997 (R. 128-89) and found no evidence of instruments 
used for burglary nor cut or broken padlocks on or about the 
Appellant or his truck, it was incumbent upon defense counsel to 
investigate the recent burglaries to determine any modes operandi, 
fingerprints or other evidence which may have existed that would 
co-oberate his client's story and develop some theory of the case. 
Mr. Gravis did nothing. This failure to investigate demonstrates 
that Appellant's attorney's failure to investigate and see if 
others were being charged with prior recent burglaries had a 
detrimental impact on the presentation of Appellant's primary 
defense - that he was gathering what he thought was abandoned 
property from already opened storage units. Defense counsel 
completely failed to investigate or present evidence during his 
case in chief of third party culpability. Clearly, the existence 
of the mystery woman, Talbot's hearsay remarks that she filtered 
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through abandoned storage sheds from time to time, the total 
failure of the officers to locate any burglary tools on or around 
Appellant and the witnesses' statements that they saw no evidence 
of burglary or a break in put defense counsel on notice that he was 
required to put on at least some evidence of third party 
culpability. This evidence would certainly raise a reasonable 
doubt as to the Appellant's guilt. Third party culpability 
evidence is like any other evidence: If it is relevant, it is 
admissible pursuant to Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence, unless is 
probabitive value is substantially out weighed by the risk of undue 
delay, prejudice or confusion. Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 403. 
As Wigmore states "if the evidence is really of no appreciable 
value, no harm is done in admitting it; but if the evidence is in 
truth calculated to cause the jury to doubt, the Court should not 
attempt to decide for the jury that this doubt is purely 
speculative and fantastic, but should afford the accused every 
opportunity to create that doubt." (1A wigmore, Evidence (Sellers 
Rev. Ed. 1980) Section 139, P. 1724) cited in People v. Hall, 718 
P. 2d 99 (Cal. 1986) When the proper inquiry is to determine 
whether evidence could raise a reasonable doubt as to Appellant's 
guilt, it was incumbent upon defense counsel to investigate and to 
bring that evidence before the Court. Here, counsel's failure 
constitute ineffective assistance for Appellant. 
B. FAILURE TO PILE AND/OR ARGUE SUPPRESSION MOTION 
CONCERNING IN CUSTODY STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT AND REPEATED TO 
THE JURY IN REFERENCE TO THE CAMPER SHELL, COUCH AND MISCELLANEOUS 
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PROPERTY WITH WHICH APPELLANT WAS NOT CHARGED, INCLUDING WASHING 
MACHINE, DRUGS AND PARAPHERNALIA. 
Defense counsel failed to file and/or argue that Appellant's 
in custody statements, as well as pre-Miranda silence, was 
inadmissible and allowed the State to produce said silence and 
statements against interest to the jury during the prosecutor's 
opening statements, and examination of witnesses. 
"The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory 
or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of a 
Defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards 
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination". 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436; 86 Sup. Ct. 1602; 16 L. Ed. 2nd 
694 (1966). The Fifth Amendment provides: "no person shall... be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself". 
U.S. Const. Amend. V. The Court has ruled a Defendant's silence 
cannot be used to impeach his testimony at trial if his silence 
follows the delivery of Miranda warnings. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 
610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976). "Every post arrest 
silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is 
required to advise the person arrested." Id. 426 U.S. at 617, 96 
S. Ct. at 2244. 
In addition, the Utah Court of Appeals has extended a 
Defendant's right to remain silent before he is taken into custody. 
In State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 349 (Utah App. 1993), the Court 
stated: 
Merely because an individual does 
not need to be advised of his right 
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to remain silence until he is 
subject to a custodial interrogation 
does not mean he should be penalized 
for invoking that right earlier. To 
hold differently would impermissible 
burden Fifth Amendment protections 
for any individual who attempts to 
exercise them prior to a custodial 
interrogation. Such a rule would 
also encourage the authorities to 
refrain from issuing Miranda 
warnings as long as possible in an 
attempt to generate inferential 
evidence of guilt from silence or an 
admission prior to custodial 
interrogation. Providing law 
enforcement an incentive to withhold 
Miranda warnings would be poor 
public policy and contrary to the 
spirit of Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence." 
The statements used concerning Appellant's pre-arrest and in-
custody silence and statements not only reflect his counsel's 
inadequacy, but should be classified as harmful as it undermines 
confidence in the verdict, especially in light of the other errors 
which occurred in this case. The prosecutor mentioned to the jury, 
during his opening statement, that Appellant "volunteers no other 
information to the officer." (R. 129-7) This statement serves no 
other purpose that to provide inferential evidence of guilt from 
Appellant's silence. 
After a formal arrest was made, Appellant was not advised of 
his Miranda rights for at least an hour and after he had been 
transported to the Roy Police Station. While he was handcuffed and 
sitting in one of the patrol cars at Mollerup's Storage, Appellant 
is said to have made extremely prejudicial statements to the police 
concerning the ownership of a "hype-kit" that was found in the 
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truck and marijuana found in his shirt pocket. Clearly, this is 
the type of police behavior anticipated by the Courts in Miranda 
and Palmer and their progeny. Defense counsel made no attempt to 
even limit these statements as they were heard by the jury. There 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. 
It is clear from the record that Appellant was in custody when 
Officer Hackworth learned that the Appellant had given false 
information to a police officer and the police officer verified 
that, in fact, Appellant had given the wrong name and date of 
birth. At that time, there were two (2) uniformed police officers 
at the scene and Detective Bryson soon arrived. During Appellant's 
pre-Miranda encounter with the police officers (R. 128-26, 31, 32 
and 33) , the Appellant chose to remain silent during much of the 
interview. After Detective Bryson arrived, the Appellant then did 
make statements to the police authorizing entry into his truck to 
his storage unit and statements made concerning ownership of 
property. At that time, the Appellant was in custody and clearly 
cannot be said to have been free to leave the scene. 
After police contacted a witness, to-wit: Nicole Ayers, and 
after she identified some articles in and on Appellant's truck to 
have been her property located in her storage unit, Appellant was 
formerly arrested. In fact, evidence and id. of this witness came 
solely from an illegal search of the truck. He was not, however, 
given his Miranda warnings until approximately an hour later after 
having been transported to the Office of Detective Bryson at the 
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police station for a personal interview. After his formal arrest, 
but prior to Miranda being given to the Appellant, the officer 
stated that they found a hype kit in his truck and the Appellant 
told the officers that it was his and that he had a drug problem. 
Further, they discovered marijuana in his pocket to which he 
admitted owning. (R. 128-123) 
In addition, the officers conducted what they classified as a 
"inventory search" of the Appellant's truck and storage unit. 
(R. 128-95) This "inventory search" of the truck and the storage 
unit were both performed prior to Mirandizing the Appellant. In 
fact, the officers had opened Appellant's truck and taken articles 
out of the truck prior to Appellant's formal arrest so the search 
cannot be classified as a search incident to an arrest. This 
behavior on the part of the police officers at this point in time 
can clearly not be identified as performing an "inventory search". 
There is absolutely no reason why the officers could have not 
secured a search warrant for the storage shed and the Appellant's 
truck. There were no extenuating circumstances, as the Appellant 
was clearly restrained by police and not free to leave after the 
officer had discovered that the Appellant had given him a false 
name and date of birth. Appellant's statements while made in 
custody were clearly prejudicial and should have been suppressed. 
There was no possible benefit to Appellant for not filing a 
suppression motion. 
The State relied heavily upon the Appellant's statement that 
everything in the truck belonged to him. During the prosecutor's 
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opening arguments as well as during the trial on the matter the 
State dealt heavily on this. In addition, it is admitted by the 
State that the Appellant was under arrest when he admitted to 
owning the drug paraphernalia and the marijuana found after the 
arrest, but before the State decided to provide the Appellant with 
his Miranda rights. 
C. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO LE DOUX'S COMPETENCE TO TESTIFY 
CONCERNING PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES WITH REGARDS TO STORAGE COMPANY 
ACTIVITIES AND WITH REGARDS TO WITNESSES' INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS. 
The State called Mr. Le Doux for two reasons: First, to 
establish who called the police to Mollerup's Storage and second, 
to testify concerning Mollerup's practices and procedures 
concerning the safe keeping of property in individual units. Its 
the second purpose of Le Doux's testimony that was improper and 
highly prejudicial. Defense counsel not only failed to object to 
the lack of foundation to this testimony, but also failed to call 
into question Le Doux's inconsistent statements. 
Mr. Le Doux had nothing to do with the management or rental of 
the units at Mollerup's, but only maintained two rental units at 
the facility. He testified that he was aware of the management 
policy and procedures used when tenants failed to pay their rent in 
a timely manner (R. 128-8) , but went on to admit that his knowledge 
came from the fact that his storage units were sealed by Mollerup 
because he was delinquent in his rental payments and that he could 
not gain access to those units as a result thereof. (R. 128-9) He 
had no idea of Mollerup's policies when property was abandoned when 
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renters failed to pay rent for long periods of time. 
Rule 4 01 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "relevant 
evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. The only value of Le Doux's testimony concerning 
Mollerup's procedures is to create an assumption that property is 
never abandoned and therefore, all property in Appellant's 
possession came from Appellant burglarizing storage units. This 
testimony was extremely prejudicial, even in the event the Court 
finds the testimony relevant. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence provides that even if 
evidence is relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probation 
value is substantially out weighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury... By 
allowing the assumption that Mollerup's Storage never abandoned 
property or left unit doors open when property had been abandoned, 
an assumption created by Le Doux's testimony, Appellant was 
extremely prejudiced, especially in light of the fact that the 
State knew the manager of the storage units and, in fact, knew he 
had been present during the search on March 2 9th. Detective Bryson 
testified that she knew who he was. Defense counsel failed to 
object and failed to make any inquiries concerning management 
practices and/or policies from management personnel. 
In addition, while Mr. Le Doux observed Appellant for about 15 
minutes prior to the arrival of the police, during which time 
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Appellant went on with his business, defense counsel failed to 
object to Le Doux's speculation that Appellant had no reason to pay 
attention to him. (R. 128-13) Defense counsel failed to inquire 
as to the location of the witness and whether Appellant appeared to 
know he was there and watching. The argument should have been made 
that if Appellant was aware of the witness' observations, and 
continued his activity, it is reasonable that Appellant felt his 
activities innocent and made no effort to hide them. 
D. DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY CLOSED DEFENSE WITHOUT ANY WITNESSES 
AND DEFENDANT HAD TO ASK THE COURT IF HE COULD TESTIFY AS HE WAS 
THE ONLY POSSIBLE WITNESS PRESENT IN HIS BEHALF. 
Not only did defense counsel fail to adequately cross examine 
witnesses as above described, but he failed to put on a defense, 
beginning with his waiver of any opening statement. (R. 128-138) 
He then closed his case without conferring with Appellant. 
Appellant had to ask the Court to reopen to let him testify in 
order to put on any defense whatsoever. (R. 128-140) 
There are several other instances in the record that required 
defense counsel to take note and investigate. 
1. The first instance was the mention of an individual 
present at the storage units when Le Doux arrived, apparently a 
lady who rents next to him, who was never located or questioned. 
(R. 128-15) Nothing more is mentioned of this mystery lady and no 
one knows if she saw anyone actually breaking into any of the units 
the day in question. 
2. The second instance was the mention of Lynnette Talbot, 
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the mystery woman who appeared out of nowhere to identify a "shell" 
as belonging to her that was located in Appellant's storage unit, 
(R. 128-82) and Appellant was never charged with theft of this 
item. Ms. Talbot was not present at trial nor did she testify. 
However, her identification and proof of ownership of alleged 
stolen property was received into evidence without any objection 
from defense counsel. Hackworth testified that Talbot claimed 
ownership of the camper shell. (R. 128-51) This was clearly a 
non-verbal statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted 
and was therefore inadmissible hearsay and yet, defense counsel 
made no attempt to object to or have that testimony stricken. 
Hackworth admitted that this information was not in his police 
report, and still defense counsel made no objection and still there 
was no Ms. Talbot at trial. (R. 128-51) Further, by the time that 
Appellant consented to the opening of his storage unit so that Ms. 
Talbot could identify her shell, Appellant was in custody and had 
not been advised of his Miranda rights. Still defense counsel did 
not object. It seems clear that the officers and the State were 
using hearsay statements and conjecture and presenting them to the 
jury to develop their case. The officers had Appellant in custody 
and failed to read him his Miranda rights so he would incriminate 
himself with information sufficient to convict. (R. 128-34) Even 
Detective Bryson had arrived at the scene prior to finding the 
shell. (R. 128-84) Appellant was surrounded by uniformed police 
with no opportunity to leave the scene or ask for counsel in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution and Article 
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7 Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. Also Bryson testified that 
Talbot used to go to the storage units and clean out abandoned 
units. Defense counsel did not talk to nor did he subpoena Talbot. 
E. FAILURE TO DEMAND A FOUNDATION BEFORE PHOTOS WERE ENTERED 
AS EVIDENCE; THEY CONTAINED ITEMS WITH WHICH DEFENDANT WAS NOT 
CHARGED AND WERE PREJUDICIAL. 
There were many photographs that were introduced and received 
into evidence without objection of defense counsel. These 
photographs depict various kinds of property at various locations. 
The State failed to provide any foundation for the admittance of 
these pictures and defense failed to demand one. There is nothing 
in the record to suggest who took the pictures, when they were 
taken and where. Without a proper foundation before introduction 
of the photos, there is no way to determine if they were true 
representations of evidence that the State had admitted through 
testimony of its witnesses. Pursuant to the very definition of 
"laying a foundation", the photos were inadmissible without it. 
Besides, Defendant was not charged with the theft of anything 
besides the couch and camper shell. The pictures were prejudicial. 
The pictures represented a considerable amount of personal property 
with which Appellant was not charged and may very well have owned. 
Again, defense counsel made no objection or even mentioned that a 
foundation was needed concerning the photos. State's exhibit P-l 
was a photo of Ayers' couch identified by Hackworth at (R. 128-20), 
identified by Ayers at (R. 128-61) and received into evidence at 
(R. 128-62). State's exhibit P-2 was a photo of property contained 
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in the truck, identified by Hackworth at (R. 128-22), identified by 
Ayers at (R. 128-64) and received by the Court at (R. 128-64) . 
State's exhibit P-6 was a photo of Appellant's truck and was 
identified by Stevens at (R. 128-79), by Hackworth at (R. 128-20) 
and received into evidence at (R. 128-134) . Apparently there were 
other photos offered but not received. (R. 128-134) State's 
exhibit 15 was admitted into evidence over defense objection, but 
there had been no identification of this exhibit during the trial. 
(R. 128-134) State's exhibit 10 was identified by Stevens and 
received into evidence by the Court. (R. 128-92, 93, 134) It is 
unclear from the transcript whether State's exhibit 7 was received, 
there had been no identification of this exhibit during the trial 
on the matter. All items that were photographed, but with which 
Appellant was not charged, including the camper shell and washing 
machine, were not relevant and should have been excluded. 
"Determining whether evidence is relevant requires a balancing of 
factors and [the Court] will reverse a determination of relevancy 
only if the trial Court abused its discretion." Olympus Hills v. 
Smiths Food King, 889 P.2d 445, 454 (Utah App. 1994) citing State 
v. Wetzel, 868 P. 2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993) . Not only were the mention 
and photographs of the camper shell, washing machine and boxes of 
other items improper for the purpose of proving Appellant stole 
them, but they were improperly put to the jury for no other 
reasons. Surely, these items cannot be used to prove burglary, 
although it appears that they were put before the jury for that 
purpose. The State created improper and prejudicial innuendo and 
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defense counsel failed to object and the Court abused its 
discretion by allowing the photos to go to the jury. 
Detective Bryson's testimony concerning the washing machine 
and Appellant's alleged confession with regards thereto had no 
purpose but to inflame the jury. (R. 128-127-129) Defense counsel 
failed to object that the prosecutor failed to support prejudicial, 
inculpatory inferences arising from his questions and statements 
with appropriate evidence. 
Circumstantial evidence, although relevant, may nevertheless 
be excluded by reason of the general principle that usefulness of 
evidence is more than counterbalanced by disadvanteous effects in 
confusing issues before the jury, or in creating undue prejudice in 
excess of its legitimate probative weight. Terry v. Zions Co-op, 
605 P.2d, 314, 322 (Utah 1979). This evidence had no conceivable 
beneficial value to Appellant and the failure to object to it 
cannot be excused as trial strategy. Appellant's counsel was 
deficient in failing to object to evidence so clearly in violation 
of Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
P. DEFENSE FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE CROSS EXAMINATION OF 
APPELLANT AS BEING BEYOND THE SCOPE OF DIRECT AND THE COURT SHOULD 
HAVE RECOGNIZED THE ERROR. 
Rule 104(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "the 
accused does not, by testifying upon a preliminary matter, become 
subject to cross examination as to other issues in the case." 
During Appellant's trial, defense counsel rested without 
consulting Appellant or calling any witnesses. Appellant presented 
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his theory of the case in reference to theft and burglary to the 
jury during his direct examination. During the prosecutor's cross 
examination, the State began questioning Appellant concerning the 
"hype kit" and marijuana. Defense counsel objected on the grounds 
of relevancy, but failed to bring the question of "beyond the scope 
of direct and Rule 104(d) Utah Rules of Evidence to the Court's 
attention. (R. 128-152) It also appears from the transcript that 
defense counsel may have stipulated that his client was guilty of 
the two drug charges. (R. 128-152 and 154) Defense counsel's 
conduct was extremely prejudicial to Appellant. 
0, DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO ARGUE THAT THE OFFICES AT THE 
SCENE HAD NO REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP HIS ACTIVITIES AND SEARCH 
HIS TRUCK AND THAT THE DETENTION WAS NOT REASONABLE IN SCOPE AS IT 
RELATED TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE. 
The Court must make a duel inquiry to determine whether a 
search or seizure is constitutionally reasonable: " (l) Was the 
police officer's action justified at its inception and (2) was the 
resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first place?" 
Rodriguez-Lopez, supra at 20, citing State v. Lopez, 873 P. 2d 1127, 
1131-32. 
Section 77-7-15 (1995), Utah Code Annotated provides when "a 
peace officer may stop a person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act 
of committing or attempting to commit a public offense and may 
demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions." 
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This section mandates a reasonable suspicion in a public place 
that an officer observes. 
Here, the police were informed of suspicious activity on 
private property. The officers obtained a false name from 
Appellant, but had no evidence at that time that he was committing 
or about to commit a public offense. Certainly, the giving of a 
false name does not permit the officer, nor provide the authority 
to the officer of entering Appellant's vehicle without an arrest or 
inventory search. There was nothing illegal and in plain sight 
that would lead the officer to believe he needed to search the 
truck for weapons, especially in light of the fact that Appellant 
was not near the truck anyway. 
The Court requires that the resulting detention is reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place. 
There was no one at the scene that observed Appellant breaking 
into any storage unit or stealing any property. Further, the 
Appellant had every right to be on the property because he also 
rented a unit. The police found no witness to identify property in 
Appellant's possession that was not his until after they improperly 
entered the back of the tuck. "A warrantless search of an 
automobile is not justified by probable cause alone, but must also 
be premised upon exigent circumstances.11 State v. Maycock, 329 
Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (10/30/97) Long before the officers entered the 
truck, they knew that Appellant had given a false name and that 
they would be taking him to jail. It would have been appropriate 
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to impound the truck and make a proper inventory. Had they done 
what they should have done, many of the items shown to the jury 
could well have belonged to the Appellant, substantiating his 
defense. Still, defense counsel did not object. 
ISSUE 2 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
A. PRE-MIRANDA STATEMENTS AND SILENCE. 
Appellant incorporates his arguments contained in Section IB 
above and incorporates that argument herein as through specifically 
stated herein. 
As stated in State v. Fence, 109 Wis. 2.d 224, 325 N.W. 2d 703 
(1982), cited in Palmer, supra at 860 P.2d 339, 349: 
The Fifth Amendment protects a 
person from compelled self-
incrimination at all times, not just 
upon arrest or during custodial 
interrogation. Any time an 
individual is questioned by the 
police, that individual is compelled 
to do one of two things - either 
speak or remain silent. If both a 
person's pre-arrest speech and 
silence may be used against that 
person, as the State suggests, that 
person has no choice that will 
present self-incrimination. This is 
a verifiable "catch 22". Thus the 
State's theory places an 
impermissible burden on the exercise 
of Fifth Amendment rights. 
In the case before the bar, Hackworth began questioning 
Appellant and Amador immediately upon his arrival. Appellant 
remained silent during most of this questioning. Appellant's 
silence during this questioning was made clear to the jury by the 
State during the trial (R. 128-26, 31, 32 and 33) and during the 
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State's opening statement. (R. 129-7) Further, after the arrival 
of Stevens and Bryson, the officers had knowledge that Appellant 
had given false information to a police officer and Appellant was 
clearly not free to leave and was in custody. Appellant's 
statements concerning ownership of property, as well as his consent 
to search the storage shed and the officer's search of the truck 
prior to the "inventory search" should have been suppressed. 
The prosecutor was well aware of the fact that after an 
arrest, the State is required to give an individual his Miranda 
rights prior to interrogating him concerning anything. The 
Appellant had not waived any rights whatsoever when the police 
began interrogating him when he was first taken into custody after 
Hackworth found out that he had given him a false name and date of 
birth. Appellant was never advised that he did not have to discuss 
anything concerning this matter without the assistance of counsel 
or that any statements he made could and would be used against him 
in a Court of law. The prosecutor also committed misconduct when 
he established that the Appellant committed theft of the shell by 
hearsay, especially since Appellant was never charged with that 
theft. The State knew or should have know that the identification 
of the stolen shell could only be made by the individual owning the 
shell. Anything else was hearsay. The officer testifying that Ms. 
Talbot owned the shell was, at the very least, a non verbal 
statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted and was 
inadmissible. Further, by the time Appellant consented to the 
opening of the storage unit so that Mrs. Talbot could identify her 
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shell, Appellant was in custody and had not been advised of his 
Miranda rights. 
As noted in State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992), 
generally the test used for determining whether a prosecutor's 
statements are improper and constitute error is whether the remarks 
called to the juror's attention matters which would not be 
justified in considering and in reaching a verdict. Improper 
statements will require reversal if they are determined to be 
harmful. Because the prosecutor's misconduct during his cross 
examination of Appellant should have been obvious to the trial 
Court, it should be considered to be harmful. State v. Palmer, 860 
P.2d 342 (Utah Ct. App., 1993); quoting State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 
48, 51 (Utah, 1983) . 
B. THE STATE COMMITTED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT BY 
PRESENTING UNSUPPORTED INNUENDOS IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT AND 
THROUGH THE WITNESSES DURING THE TRIAL ON THE MATTER, WHICH 
PROVIDED THE JURY A BASIS TO IMPUTE MOTIVES AND ACTIONS ON THE PART 
OF T HE APPELLANT THAT WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY TESTIMONY WITH 
REGARDS TO PROPERTY WITH WHICH DEFENDANT WAS NOT CHARGED, I.E. 
IMPROPER STATEMENTS BY THE STATE CONCERNING PROPERTY IN DEFENDANTS 
POSSESSION FOR WHICH HE WAS NOT CHARGED WITH THEFT OR ANY OTHER 
CRIME, SUCH AS BOXES AS PERSONAL PROPERTY AND THE WASHING MACHINE 
THAT WAS IN HIS STORAGE SHED. 
The State failed to support prosecutory and inculpatory 
inferences arising from his opening statement and questions with 
appropriate evidence. There was never any evidence produced that 
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articles other than Talbots and Nicole Ayers' property belonged to 
anybody else but Appellant. The innuendo throughout the trial, 
however, was that there was a truck full of items that did not 
belong to the Appellant. The State put on absolutely no evidence 
that this property did not belong to the Appellant. The inference 
was there that the Appellant had gone through many storage units 
and had stolen all of that property, even though the State produced 
no victim and no identification of the property, and that the 
Appellant was never charged with theft of that property. Even if 
Appellant was charged with other thefts, the trials would have been 
served and each act restricted to each separate trial. State v. 
Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 198) The theft with which the 
Appellant was charged was identified to be property of Nicole 
Ayers, to-wit: A couch and a day planner of a value less than 
$300.00. The use of boxes of items, photographs of boxes of items 
and Bryson's interview with the Appellant concerning the washing 
machine was inadmissible and clearly prejudicial. Other than 
Nicole Ayers7 testimony, there is no evidence in the record that 
the Appellant committed burglary other than by inference. There 
were no burglary tools in the area, no witnesses observed the 
Appellant breaking into any of the storage units, there were no 
broken locks found on or about the Appellant's property. The 
inference surely was drawn by the jury that because he had all of 
these items in his truck that apparently did not belong to him, 
that he must have broken in and burglarized the other storage 
units. Without the photographs and the testimony concerning other 
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property, clearly there is a question as to what the outcome would 
have been. If the State had been limited to discussing only those 
items with which the Appellant was charged, to-wit: the couch and 
the day planner, and if the photographs of all the boxes of 
property and the piles of property had been excluded and if the 
inadmissible statements made by Appellant had been excluded, it 
would have been very difficult for the jury to reach a verdict of 
guilty of burglary or the Misdemeanor counts. As the Court found 
in State v. Emmett, supra at 786 - 787, (generally it is error to 
ask an accused a question that implies the existence of a 
prejudicial fact unless the prosecution can prove the existence of 
that fact. The introduction of the testimony concerning the 
washing machine and piles and piles of property belonging to 
apparently no one was clearly a prejudicial fact that the 
prosecutor did not prove the existence of. In this case, the 
nature of the prosecutor's statements during opening argument and 
questions during examination of witnesses and the strong 
inculpatory inference contained therein, must lead the Court to 
dispense with the requirement of obviousness with regards to the 
plain error test so that justice can be done. An analysis of the 
harmfulness of this error should be considered in conjunction with 
all other errors of the case. 
A comment by a prosecutor during opening arguments that the 
jury consider matters that are not proved as evidence during the 
trial is prosecutorial misconduct. 
Because the Defendant's counsel failed to object to the comments, 
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the Court can reach them under the plan error analysis and/or 
evaluate defenses' failure to object under the Strickland test as 
to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's attorney failed to investigate recent burglaries 
of Mollerup's Storage Facility and failed to investigate evidence 
of third party culpability. 
Defendant's attorney failed to file and/or argue suppression 
motions concerning pre-miranda silence and in custody statements 
made by Defendant and repeated to the jury in reference to the 
camper shell, various personal property, drug paraphernalia and 
ownership of property with which Appellant was not charged. 
Defense counsel failed to object to Le Doux's competency to 
testify concerning practices and procedure with regards to the 
storage company activities and with regards to the witnesses' 
inconsistent statements. 
Defense counsel failed to adequately defend and closed his 
case without calling witnesses or consultation with his client, 
which forced Appellant to ask the Court directly if he could 
testify to at least put on some theory of the defense and some 
defense at all. Defendant was effectively forced to testify 
against himself in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution and Sections 7 and 12 of the Utah 
State Constitution. 
Defense counsel failed to object to State's photo exhibits 
which were admitted into evidence without objection from defense 
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counsel and which were prohibited by Rules 401 and 403, Utah Rules 
of Evidence, and which were highly prejudicial and contained 
articles with which Defendant was not charged, which allowed the 
jury to speculate that Appellant had stolen or retrieved these 
items from burglarized storage units. 
Defense counsel failed to object to the State's improperly 
presented unsupported innuendo in his opening statement and through 
witnesses, which provided the jury a basis to impute motives and 
actions to Defendant that were not supported by any testimony with 
regards to property with which Defendant was not charged, i.e. 
improper statements by the State concerning property in Defendant's 
possession with which he was not charged with theft or any other 
crime. The State failed to support prejudicial inculpatory 
inferences arising from his opening statement and examination of 
witnesses with appropriate evidence. 
The State offered and the Court received Appellant's 
inadmissible pre-miranda silence and in custody statements. 
The State committed prosecutorial misconduct by presenting 
unsupported innuendo in opening statements, and through witness 
testimony which provided the jury a basis to impute motives and 
actions of Appellant that were not supported by any testimony with 
regards to property with which Appellant was not charged, i.e. in 
proper statements by the State concerning property in Appellant's 
possession even though he was never charged with the theft of those 
items. The State failed to support prejudicial inculpatory 
47 
inferences arising from the State's questions with appropriate 
evidence. 
DATED this day of May, 1998. 
RANDINE SALERNO, 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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76-6-105 CRIMINAL CODE 
(b) a class B misdemeanor if the damage to property is 
or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000 in value; and 
(c) a class C misdemeanor if the damage to property is 
or exceeds $150 but is less than $300 in value. 
(4) Any other violation under Subsection (c) shall constitute 
an infraction. 1995 
76-6-105. Caus ing a catastrophe. 
(1) Any person who by explosion, fire, flood, avalanche, 
collapse of a building, release of poison gas, radioactive 
material, or other harmful or destructive force or substance, or 
by any other means, causes a widespread injury or damage to 
persons or property is guilty of causing a catastrophe. 
(2) Causing a catastrophe is a felony of the second degree if 
the person causes it knowingly and a class A misdemeanor if 
caused recklessly. 1973 
76-6-106. Criminal mischief. 
( 1 ) A person commits criminal mischief if the person: 
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, dam-
ages or destroys property with the intention of defrauding 
an insurer; 
(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the 
property of another and thereby: 
(i) recklessly endangers human life; or 
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial 
interruption or impairment of any public utility ser-
vice; 
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the 
property of another; or 
(d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or 
other object at or against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, 
boat, locomotive, train, railway car, or caboose, whether 
moving or standing. 
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a felony of the 
third degree. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a class A misde-
meanor. 
(c) Any other violation of this section is a: 
(i) felony of the second degree if the actor's conduct 
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal to 
or in excess of $5,000 in value; 
(ii) felony of the third degree if the actor's conduct 
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal to 
or in excess of $1,000 but is less than $5,000 in value; 
(iii) class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct 
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal to 
or in excess of $300 but is less than $1,000 in value; 
and 
(iv) class B misdemeanor if the actor's conduct 
causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss less 
than $300 in value. 
(3) In determining the value of damages under this section, 
or for computer crimes under Section 76-6-703, the value of 
any computer, computer network, computer property, com-
puter services, software, or data shall include the measurable 
value of the loss of use of such items and the measurable cost 
to replace or restore such items. 1997 
76-6-107. Graffiti defined — Pena l t i e s — Removal costs 
— Re imbursement liability. 
(1) "Graffiti" means any form of unauthorized printing, 
writing, spraying, scratching, affixing, or inscribing on the 
property of another regardless of the content or nature of the 
material used in the commission of the act. 
(2) "Victim" means the person or entity whose property was 
defaced by the graffiti and bears the expense for its removal. 
(3) Graffiti is a: 
(a) second degree felony if the damage caused is in 
excess of $5,000; 
(b) third degree felony if the damage caused is *£* 
of $1,000; . 3 ! 
(c) class A misdemeanor if the damage caused w 
to or in excess of $300; and .}.S 
(d) class B misdemeanor if the damage causell 
than $300. * 
(4) Damages under Subsection (3) include reu _ 
repair costs, or replacement costs, whichever is lesi" 
(5) The court, upon conviction or adjudication, u. 
restitution to the victim in the amount of removal j 
replacement costs. 
(6) An additional amount of $1,000 in restitution^,., 
added to removal costs if the graffiti is positioned^ 
overpass or an underpass, requires that traffic be C" 
with in order to remove it, or the entity responsible! 
area in which the clean-up is to take place must 1 
assistance in order for the removal to take place i _ 
(7) A person who voluntarily and at his own ex 
removes graffiti for which he is responsible may be c 
the removal costs against restitution ordered by a cou 
PART 2 
BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS! 
76-6-201. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: '. * 
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary 
means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping]!! 
other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight i 
modation of persons or for carrying on businessT 
and includes: 
(a) each separately secured or occupied ] 
the structure or vehicle; and 
(b) each structure appurtenant to or 
with the structure or vehicle. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usuallyi 
pied by a person lodging therein at night, whetherr 
a person is actually present. 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in I 
premises when the premises or any portion ttiererfl 
time of the entry or remaining are not open to twfp 
and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or pnvwj 
to enter or remain on the premises or such^ 
thereof. 
(4) "Enter" means: 
(a) intrusion of any part of the body; or ^J| 
(b) intrusion of any physical object undera 
the actor. 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or^ jj 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a build 
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assau 
person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree 
committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a fefea 
second degree. 
76-6-203. Aggravated burglary. f t l 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if ^.Jj 
ing, committing, or fleeing from a burglary the, 
another participant in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person w n 0 j | | 
participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a c 
weapon against any person who is not a partiap 
crime; or M'i 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explo® 
gerous weapon. 
76-6-402 CRIMINAL CODE 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious 
object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so 
extended a period or to use under such circumstances 
that a substantial portion of its economic value, or of 
the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a 
reward or other compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances 
that make it unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, 
but is not necessarily limited to, conduct heretofore de-
fined or known as common-law larceny by trespassory 
taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, and 
embezzlement. 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an 
impression of law or fact that is false and that the 
actor does not believe to be true and tha£ is likely to 
affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact 
that the actor previously created or confirmed by 
words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment 
of another and that the actor does not now believe to 
be true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information 
likely to affect his judgment in the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers prop-
erty without disclosing a lien, security interest, ad-
verse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoy-
ment of the property, whether the lien, security 
interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is 
or is not a matter of official record; or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect 
the judgment of another in the transaction, which 
performance the actor does not intend to perform or 
knows will not be performed; provided, however, that 
failure to perform the promise in issue without other 
evidence of intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof 
that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the 
promise would not be performed. 1973 
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses. 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall 
be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in pos-
session stole the property. 
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an 
interest in the property or service stolen if another person 
also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to 
infringe, provided an interest in property for purposes of 
this subsection shall not include a security interest for the 
repayment of a debt or obligation. 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the 
property or service involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right 
to obtain or exercise control over the property or 
service as he did; or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property 
or service honestly believing that the owner, if 
present, would have consented. 1974 
76-6-403. Theft — Evidence to support accusation. 
Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a single 
offense embracing the separate offenses such as those hereto-
fore known as larceny, larceny by trick, larceny by bailees, 
embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, receiving 
stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported by 
evidence that it was committed in any manner siv 
Sections 76-6-404 through 76-6-410, subject to the u 
the court to ensure a fair trial by granting a contmS 
other appropriate relief where the conduct of the 
would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprj 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises I 
rized control over the property of another with a i 
deprive him thereof. 
76-6-405. Theft by deception. 
( D A person commits theft if he obtains or exen 
over property of another by deception and with a i 
deprive him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, wh 
is only falsity as to matters having no pecuniary sii 
or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary? 
in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an ex 
commendation of wares or worth in communicatj 
dressed to the public or to a class or group. 
76-6-406. Theft by extortion. 
(1) A person is guilty of theft if he obtains or'i 
control over the property of another by extortion i 
purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) As used in this section, extortion occurs whenl 
threatens to: ^ * 
(a) Cause physical harm in the future to i 
threatened or to any other person or to prop 
time; or 
(b) Subject the person threatened or any < 
to physical confinement or restraint; or 
(c) Engage in other conduct constituting a'< 
(d) Accuse any person of a crime or 
hatred, contempt, or ridicule; or fr| 
(e) Reveal any information sought to be con 
the person threatened; or 
(f) Testify or provide information or wit] 
mony or information with respect to another's! 
or defense; or 
(g) Take action as an official against any 
thing, or withhold official action, or cause su 
withholding; or 
(h) Bring about or continue a strike, boyo 
similar collective action to obtain property ^ 
demanded or received for the benefit of the j 
the actor purports to represent; or 
(i) Do any other act which would not in its 
tially benefit him but which would harm i 
any other person with respect to that 
safety, business, calling, career, financial < 
tation, or personal relationships. 
76-6-407. Theft of lost, mislaid, or mistal 
ered property. 
A person commits theft when: 
(1) He obtains property of another whicJ 
have been lost or mislaid, or to have been de 
a mistake as to the identity of the recipien^ 
nature or amount of the property, without £a 
able measures to return it to the owner; f 
(2) He has the purpose to deprive the^ 
property when he obtains the property o& 
prior to taking the measures designated^injr 
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — 1 
brokers. 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives/?* 
poses of the property of another knowing 
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section (8). Each separate violation of this subsection is a 
third degree felony and is also subject to a civil penalty 
not to exceed $5,000. 
(b) The procedure for determining a civil violation of 
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 58-1-
108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the divi-
sion. 
(c) Civil penalties assessed under this subsection shall 
be deposited in the General Fund. 
(12) (a) The failure of a pharmacist in charge to submit 
information to the database as required under this section 
after the division has submitted a specific writ ten request 
for the information or when the division determines the 
individual has a demonstrable pat tern of failing to submit 
the information as required is grounds for the division to 
take the following actions in accordance with Section 
58-1-401: 
(i) refuse to issue a license to the individual; 
(ii) refuse to renew the individual's license; 
(iii) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation 
the license; 
(iv) issue a public or private reprimand to the 
individual; 
(v) issue a cease and desist order; and 
(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 
for each dispensed prescription regarding which the 
required information is not submitted. 
(b) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection (a)(vi) 
shall be deposited in the General Fund. 
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of 
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 58-1-
108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the divi-
sion. 
(13) An individual who has submitted information to the 
database in accordance with this section may not be held 
civilly liable for having submitted the information. 
(14) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to 
establish and operate the database shall be funded by 
appropriations from the General Fund. 
(b) Funding for this section shall be appropriated with-
out the use of any resources within the Commerce Service 
Fund. 
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting 
data as required in this section shall be assumed by the 
submitting drug outlet. 1996 
58-37-8. Prohibi ted acts — Penal t i e s . 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful 
for any person to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess 
with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a 
controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, 
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance 
with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise 
where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages 
in conduct which results in any violation of any 
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, 
or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a par t of a continuing 
series of two or more violations of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate 
occasions tha t are undertaken in concert with 
five or more persons with respect to whom the 
person occupies a position of organizer, supervi. 
sor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) 
with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a 
controlled substance analog is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent con-
viction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or 
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon 
a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second 
degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subse-
quent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than 
seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the 
person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly 
from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by 
this subsection; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in 
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, 
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to 
permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully 
possessing, using, or distributing controlled sub-
stances in any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess an altered or forged prescription or written 
order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, 
is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, mari-
juana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less 
than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is 
guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form 
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and 
the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of property 
occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than 
provided in Subsection (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of posses-
sion of any controlled substance by a person, tha t person 
shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with 
respect to all other controlled substances not included in 
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one 
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction 
the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
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(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misde-
meanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a 
third degree felony 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or 
distribution of a controlled substance a license num-
ber which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued 
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a 
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or repre-
sent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apoth-
ecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other au-
thorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or 
at tempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a 
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any per-
son known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure 
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled 
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, decep-
tion, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or writ-
ten order for a controlled substance, or the use of a 
false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or to utter 
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order 
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, 
plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, 
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any 
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or 
container or labeling so as to render any drug a 
counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) 
is guilty of a third degree felony 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a 
person not authorized under this chapter who commits 
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under 
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and 
classifications under Subsection (4Kb) if the act is com-
mitted: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary 
school or on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or 
post-secondary institution or on the grounds of any of 
those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, sta-
dium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the 
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored 
by or through a school or institution under Subsec-
tions (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care 
facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or 
recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, 
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot 
or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through 
(viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, 
regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of 
a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of 
not less than five years if the penalty that would other-
wise have been established but for this subsection would 
have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of 
the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification tha t would otherwise have been 
established would have been less than a first degree 
felony but for this subsection, a person convicted under 
this subsection is guilty of one degree more than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for tha t offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this 
subsection tha t the actor mistakenly believed the indi-
vidual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the 
offense or was unaware of the individual's t rue age; nor 
tha t the actor mistakenly believed tha t the location where 
the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) 
or was unaware that the location where the act occurred 
was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is 
specified is a class B misdemeanor. 
(6) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any 
offense unlawful under this chapter is upon conviction guilty 
of one degree less than the maximum penalty prescribed for 
tha t offense. 
(7) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is 
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administra-
tive penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal 
law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal 
under federal law or the law of another state for the same 
act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(8) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evi-
dence or proof which shows a person or persons produced, 
manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a con-
trolled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character 
of the substance or substances. 
(9) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good 
faith and in the course of his professional practice only and not 
for humans , from prescribing, dispensing, or administering 
controlled substances or from causing the substances to be 
administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction 
and supervision. 
(10) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under 
this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses 
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or 
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in 
the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and 
legitimate scope of his employment. 
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of 
any provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, 
the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. 1997 
58-37-8.5. Applicabi l i ty of Title 76 prosecut ions under 
th is chapter. 
Unless specifically excluded in or inconsistent with the 
provisions of this chapter, the provisions of Title 76, Chapters 
1, 2, 3, and 4, are fully applicable to prosecutions under this 
chapter. 1997 
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;
 aCcounting of expenditures and revenues from the 
iJder this section. 
legislature may annually provide, in the Appro-
~Act, legislative direction for anticipated expendi-
^3r£he monies received under this section. 1996 
fj* Admissibil ity of Utah State Crime Labora-
s^tory documents — Drug analysis in criminal 
TP pretrial proceedings . 
^j juniss ioner of the Department of Public Safety shall 
' i standards for administration and interpretation of 
^J^and forensic analysis in accordance with Title 63, 
iter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, of: 
controlled substances as provided in Title 58, Chap-
J37; 
£(2)*'drug paraphernaha as provided in Title 58, Chapter 
7a; 
1(3) imitation controlled substances as provided in Title 
jjyChapter 37b; and 
Eft}* controlled substance precursors as provided in Title 





"Drug paraphernalia" denned. 
Considerations in determining whether object is 
drug paraphernalia. 
Unlawful acts. 
Seizure — Forfeiture — Property rights. 
7a-l. Short tit le. 
I^This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah 
Rug Paraphernalia Act." 1981 
B£7a-2. Purpose . 
¥B;1a*'the intent of this chapter to discourage the use of 
narcotics by eliminating paraphernalia designed for process-
TOringesting, or otherwise using a controlled substance. 
HMtfa-3. "Drug paraphernal ia" defined. 
l a p s e d in this chapter: 
| ^ | . * D r u g paraphernalia" means any equipment, product, 
0$%or material used, or intended for use, to plant, propagate, | j b cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, con-
pfeS!^* produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, package, 
g l tepackage , store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or 
&| | to otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the 
y^r 1 1 1" 1 1 1 ^ d y in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, and 
includes, but is not limited to: 
(1) Kits used, or intended for use, in planting, 
propagating, cultivating, growing, or harvesting any 
8pecies of plant which is a controlled substance or 
from which a controlled substance can be derived; 
(2) Kits used, or intended for use, in manufactur-
i n g , compounding, converting, producing, processing, 
°r preparing a controlled substance; 
(3) Isomerization devices used, or intended for use, 
to increase the potency of any species of plant which 
js a controlled substance; 
(4) Testing equipment used, or intended for use, to 
identify or to analyze the strength, effectiveness, or 
Purity of a controlled substance; 
m (5) Scales and balances used, or intended for use, 
111
 Weighing or measuring a controlled substance; 
(6) Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hy-
drochloride, mannitol, mannited, dextrose and lac-
tose, used, or intended for use to cut a controlled 
substance; 
(7) Separation gins and sifters used, or intended 
for use to remove twigs, seeds, or other impurities 
from marihuana; 
(8) Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing 
devices used, or intended for use to compound a 
controlled substance; 
(9) Capsules, balloons, envelopes, and other con-
tainers used, or intended for use to package small 
quantities of a controlled substance; 
(10) Containers and other objects used, or in-
tended for use to store or conceal a controlled sub-
stance; 
(11) Hypodermic syringes, needles, and other ob-
jects used, or intended for use to parenterally inject a 
controlled substance into the human body; and 
(12) Objects used, or intended for use to ingest, 
inhale, or otherwise introduce marihuana, cocaine, 
hashish, or hashish oil into the human body, includ-
ing but not limited to: 
(a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plas-
tic, or ceramic pipes with or without screens, 
permanent screens, hashish heads, or punctured 
metal bowls; 
(b) Water pipes; 
(c) Carburetion tubes and devices; 
(d) Smoking and carburetion masks; 
(e) Roach clips: meaning objects used to hold 
burning material, such as a marihuana cigarette, 
tha t has become too small or too short to be held 
in the hand; 
(f) Miniature cocaine spoons and cocaine vi-
als; 
(g) Chamber pipes; 
(h) Carburetor pipes; 
(i) Electric pipes; 
(j) Air-driven pipes; 
(k) Chillums; 
(1) Bongs; and 
(m) Ice pipes or chillers. 1981 
58-37a-4. Considerat ions in de termining whether ob-
ject is drug paraphernal ia . 
In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, the 
trier of fact, in addition to all other logically relevant factors, 
should consider: 
(1) statements by an owner or by anyone in control of 
the object concerning its use; 
(2) prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in 
control of the object, under any state or federal law 
relating to a controlled substance; 
(3) the proximity of the object, in time and space, to a 
direct violation of this chapter; 
(4) the proximity of the object to a controlled substance; 
(5) the existence of any residue of a controlled sub-
stance on the object; 
(6) instructions whether oral or written, provided with 
the object concerning its use; 
(7) descriptive materials accompanying the object 
which explain or depict its use; 
(8) national and local advertising concerning its use; 
(9) the manner in which the object is displayed for sale; 
(10) whether the owner or anyone in control of the 
object is a legitimate supplier of like or related items to 
the community, such as a licensed distributor or dealer of 
tobacco products; 
OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
(11) direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of 
sales of the object to the total sales of the business 
enterprise; 
(12) the existence and scope of legitimate uses of the 
object in the community; and 
(13) expert testimony concerning its use. 1981 
58-37a-5. Unlawful acts . 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with 
intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, culti-
vate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, pro-
duce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, 
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a 
controlled substance into the human body in violation of this 
chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with 
intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, any 
drug paraphernalia, knowing tha t the drug paraphernalia will 
be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manu-
facture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, 
analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, 
inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the 
human body in violation of this act. Any person who violates 
this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug 
paraphernalia to a person under 18 years of age who is three 
years or more younger than the person making the delivery is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any 
newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any ad-
vertisement, knowing tha t the purpose of the advertisement is 
to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
1981 
58-37a-6. Se izure — Forfeiture — Property rights . 
Drug paraphernalia is subject to seizure and forfeiture and 
no property right can exist in it. 1981 
CHAPTER 37b 
IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
Section 
58-37b-l. Short title. 
58-37b-2. Definitions. 
58-37b-3. Considerations in determining whether sub-
stance is imitation controlled substance. 
58-37b-4. Manufacture, distribution or possession of sub-
stance unlawful — Penalty. 
58-37b-5. Repealed. 
58-3 7b-6. Use of substance unlawful — Penalty. 
58-3 7b-7. Advertisement of substance unlawful — Penalty. 
58-37b-8. Exemption of persons registered under Con-
trolled Substances Act. 
58-37b-l. Short tit le. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Imitation 
Controlled Substances Act." 1982 
58-37b-2. Definit ions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Controlled substance" has the same meaning as 
provided in Section 58-37-2. 
(2) "Distribute" means the actual, constructive, or at-
tempted sale, transfer, delivery, or dispensing to another 
of an imitation controlled substance. 
(3) "Imitation controlled substance" means a substa£§ 
that is not a controlled substance or counterfeit controljS 
substance, and which by overall dosage unit substantially 
resembles a specific controlled substance in appearand 
including its color, shape, or size. 4 I 
(4) "Manufacture" means the production, preparatittf 
compounding, processing, encapsulating, tableting, pgS 
aging or repackaging, labeling or relabeling, of an imit^ 
tion controlled substance. U* 
58-37b-3. Considerat ions in de termin ing whether si^' 
s tance is imitat ion control led substance. ,-~; 
If the appearance of the dosage unit is not reasonably 
sufficient to establish that the substance is an imitati<J 
controlled substance, as in liquids or powders, the followii* 
factors should be considered: ^ 
(1) statements made by an owner or by anyone else Q 
control of the substance, concerning the nature of tfc 
substance, its use or effect, or its similarity to a controlled 
substance; J 
(2) statements made to the recipient that the substance 
may be resold at a price substantially higher than the 
usual and customary price for the ingredients contained 
in the substance; ,| 
(3) whether the substance is packaged or labeled in! 
manner similar to that generally used for controlled 
substances; >t 
(4) evasive tactics or actions utilized by the owner "or 
person in control of the substance to avoid detection "bjr 
law enforcement authorities; ^1 
(5) prior convictions of an owner or anyone in control of 
the object, under state or federal law related to controlled 
substances or fraud; and *3 
(6) the proximity of the substances to controlled sul* 
stances. .ltt 
58-37b-4. Manufacture, distr ibution or possess ion ol 
substance unlawful — Penalty. 
It is unlawful for any person to manufacture, distribute, or 
possess with intent to distribute, an imitation controlled 
substance. Any person who violates this section is guilty oft 
class A misdemeanor. 19W 
58-37b-5. Repealed. 1987 
58-37b-6. Use of substance unlawful — Penalty. 4 
It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent 
to use, an imitation controlled substance. Any person who 
violates this section is guilty of a class C misdemeanor. i#l 
58-37b-7. Advert i sement of substance unlawful — Pert 
alty. ^ 
It is unlawful for any person to place any newspaper 
magazine, handbill, or other publication, or to post or distr% 
ute in any public place, any advertisement or solicitation wiw' 
reasonable knowledge that the purpose of the advertisemenj 
or solicitation is to promote the distribution of imitatic* 
controlled substances. Any person who violates this section tf 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. *#| 
4*: 
58-37b-8. Exempt ion of persons regis tered under Col* 
trolled Substances Act. :'~k 
No civil or criminal liability shall be imposed by virtue ». 
this act on any person registered under the Controlled Sub* 
stances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses a£ 
imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investr 
gational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinal 
ar UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
77-7-20 
its execution. A copy of the warrant or notice of its 
J0**\^ and terms may be sent to one or more peace officers. 
^j0*"^
 o r notice communicated authorizes the officer to 
lH&* ?in the same manner under it as if he had an original 
1980 
s - - , Possession of warrant by arrest ing officer not 
?T" required. 
^ V peace officer who has knowledge of an outstanding 
1980 
nt of arrest may arrest a person he reasonably believes 
Zte the person described in the warrant, withe 
jfcer having physical possession of the warrant. 
%T-12« Detaining persons suspected of shoplift ing or 
&&£ library theft — Persons authorized. 
Wn\ A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's employee, ser-
fr^
 o r agent who has reasonable grounds to believe that 
mods held or displayed for sale by the merchant have been 
'Ken by a person with intent to steal may, for the purpose of 
ki«*tigating the unlawful act and attempting to effect a 
^Wcovgjy of the goods, detain the person in a reasonable 
•tnner for a reasonable length of time. 
t (2) A peace officer or employee of a library may detain a 
'person for the purposes and under the limits of Subsection (1) 
f there are reasonable grounds to believe the person violated 
JHle 76, Chapter 6, Part 8, Library Theft. 1987 
7£7-lS. Arrest wi thout warrant by peace officer — 
) / ; Reasonable grounds , w h a t const i tutes — Ex-
ftfo emption from civil or criminal liability. 
tvT(D A peace officer may arrest, without warrant, any person 
l l has reasonable ground to believe has committed a theft 
index Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 8, Library Theft, or of goods 
kid or displayed for sale. 
f: (2) A charge of theft made to a peace officer under Part 8, 
library Theft, by an employee of a library, or by a merchant, 
•erchant's employee, servant, or agent constitutes a reason-
(lfcle ground for arrest, and the police officer is relieved from 
tBqr civil or criminal liability. 1987 
Sr-
ST£7-14. Person caus ing detent ion or arrest of person 
^ suspected of shopl i f t ing or l ibrary theft — 
jji5. Civil and criminal immunity. 
Ml) A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's employee, ser-
?J*nt» or agent who causes the detention of a person as 
Jwrided in Section 77-7-12, or who causes the arrest of a 
Jjwon for theft of goods held or displayed for sale, is not 
;£™aally or civilly liable where he has reasonable and 
t|wable cause to believe the person detained or arrested 
S o t t e d a theft of goods held or displayed for sale. 
Wp A peace officer or employee of a library who causes a 
fiction or arrest of a person under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 
Pjlgfrary Theft, is not criminally or civilly liable where he has 
gffcjable and probable cause to believe that the person 
X^k^ a ^ n : of library materials. 1987 
J*5» Authority of peace officer to s top and quest ion 
p ^ f suspect — Grounds. 
|*5*ce officer may stop any person in a public place when 
H* a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or 
*r** act of committing or is attempting to commit a public 
and may demand his name, address and an explana-
* his actions. 1980 
Authority of peace officer to frisk suspect for 
dangerous w e a p o n — Grounds. 
officer who has stopped a person temporarily for 
-y£ m a y frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he 
% believes he or any other person is in danger. 1980 
77-7-17. Authority of peace officer to take possess ion 
of weapons . 
A peace officer who finds a dangerous weapon pursuant to a 
frisk may take and keep it until the completion of the 
questioning, at which time he shall either return it if lawfully 
possessed, or arrest such person. 1980 
77-7-18. Citation on misdemeanor or infract ion 
charge. 
A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person into custody, any 
public official of any county or municipality charged with the 
enforcement of the law, a port-of-entry agent as defined in 
Section 27-12-2, and a volunteer authorized to issue a citation 
under Section 41-6-19.5 may issue and deliver a citation 
requiring any person subject to arrest or prosecution on a 
misdemeanor or infraction charge to appear at the court of the 
magistrate before whom the person should be taken pursuant 
to law if the person had been arrested. 1997 
77-7-19. Appearance required by ci tat ion — Arrest for 
failure to appear — Transfer of cases — Motor 
vehic le v io lat ions — Dispos i t ion of fines and 
costs . 
(1) Persons receiving misdemeanor citations shall appear 
before the magistrate designated in the citation on or before 
the time and date specified in the citation unless the uniform 
bail schedule adopted by the Judicial Council or Subsection 
77-7-21(1) permits forfeiture of bail for the offense charged. 
(2) A citation may not require a person to appear sooner 
than five days or later than 14 days following its issuance. 
(3) A person who receives a citation and who fails to comply 
with Section 77-7-21 on or before the time and date and at the 
court specified is subject to arrest. The magistrate may issue 
a warrant of arrest. 
(4) Except where otherwise provided by law, a citation or 
information issued for violations of Title 41 shall state that the 
person receiving the citation or information shall appear 
before the magistrate who has jurisdiction over the offense 
charged. 
(5) Any justice court judge may, upon the motion of either 
the defense attorney or prosecuting attorney, based on a lack 
of territorial jurisdiction or the disqualification of the judge, 
transfer cases to a justice court with territorial jurisdiction or 
the district court within the county. 
(6) (a) Clerks and other administrative personnel serving 
the courts shall ensure that all citations for violation of 
Title 41 are filed in a court with jurisdiction and venue 
and shall refuse to receive citations that should be filed in 
another court. 
(b) Fines, fees, costs, and forfeitures imposed or col-
lected for violations of Titie 41, which are filed contrary to 
this section shall be paid to the entitled municipality or 
county by the state, county, or municipal treasurer who 
has received the fines, fees, costs, or forfeitures from the 
court which collected them. 
(c) The accounting and remitting of sums due shall be 
at the close of the fiscal year of the municipality or county 
which has received fines, fees, costs, or forfeitures as a 
result of any improperly filed citations. 1996 
77-7-20. Service of c i tat ion on defendant — Fi l ing in 
court — Contents of c i tat ions. 
(1) If a citation is issued pursuant to Section 77-7-18, the 
peace officer or public official shall issue one copy to the person 
cited and shall within five days file a duplicate copy with the 
court specified in the citation. 
(2) Each copy of the citation issued under authority of this 
chapter shall contain: 
(a) the name of the court before which the person is to 
appear; 
Art. II, § 4 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement 
between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he 
may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he 
shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall 
take Care tha t the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall 
Commission all the Officers of the United States. 
Sec. 4. [Impeachment.] 
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment 





1. [Judicial power.] 
2. [Extent of judicial power — Supreme Court — Trial and 
places of trial.] 
3. [Treason, proof and punishment.] 
Sect ion 1. [Judicial power.] 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, 
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, 
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be 
diminished during their Continuance in Office. 
Sec. 2. [Extent of judic ial power — Supreme Court — 
Trial and p laces of trial.] 
[1.] The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the 
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty 
and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the 
United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two 
or more States;—[between a State and Citizens of another 
State;]—between Citizens of different States,—between Citi-
zens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of 
different States, [and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, 
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.] 
[2.] In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Min-
isters and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, 
the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the 
other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have 
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such 
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall 
make. 
[3.] The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeach-
ment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the 
State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but 
when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at 
such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have 
directed. 
Sec. 3 . [Treason, proof and punishment . ] 
[1.] Treason against the United States, shall consist only in 
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, 
giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of 
Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same 
overt Act, or on Confession in open Court. 
[2.] The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punish-
ment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work 
Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the 
Person attainted. 
ARTICLE rVil 
[STATE AND TERRITORIAL^ 
Section 
1. [Full faith and credit to records and * 
states.] ^ 
2. [Privileges and immunities F U e 
service.] 
3. [Admission of states — Rules and ] 
the territory and 
States.] - .^  
4. [Guaranty of republican form of gave*'* 
invasion.] 
Sect ion 1. [Full faith and credit to'ri 
cial proceedings of states.] ^ 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in &L__ 
public Acts, Records, and judicial ProceedinirS 
State. And the Congress may by general LaV 
Manner in which such Acts, Records and ] 
proved, and the Effect thereof. 
Sec. 2. [Privi leges and immunit ies — ] 
jus t i ce and service.] , -^ 
[1J The Citizens of each State shall be 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the i 
[2.] A person charged in any State with Tre 
other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, andl 
another State, shall on Demand of the executive J 
the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to 1 
the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime. ;* 
[3.] No Person held to Service or Labour in one Sfi 
the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in ( 
of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged 1 
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on T 
Party to whom such Service or Labour may be < 
Sec. 3 . [Admission of s tates — Rules and 
respect ing the territory and property^ 
Uni ted States.] 
[1J New States may be admitted by the Congres^il 
Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected will 
Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be forme 
Junction of two or more States, or Par ts of States, w i j ^ ^ 
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as j~ 
of the Congress. 
[2.] The Congress shall have Power to dispose of a 
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Terrij^ 
other Property belonging to the United States; and no t t | 
this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejuo^cr 
Claims of the United States, or of any particular StateuJ 
Sec. 4. [Guaranty of republ ican form of gover 
and against invasion.] 
The United States shall guarantee to every State in^s 
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall prdt 
each of them against Invasion; and on Application o££ 
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature < 
be convened) against domestic Violence. ^-m 
ARTICLE V 
[AMENDMENT] 
[Mode of amendment . ] 
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses sb 
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Con 
tution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two-1 
of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposii 
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Art. IV, § 4 
Jits a*1** Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when 
fied by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several 
s or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one 
he* other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the 
ess; Provided that no Amendment which may be made 
Tto the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall 
Sjiy Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth 
tion of the first Article; and that no State, without its 
cnt, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. 
^ ARTICLE VI 
[MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS] 
aption of public debt — Supreme Law — Oath of 
See — Rel ig ious tests prohibited.] 
| [ l j All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, 
Ifore the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid 
tggainst the United States under this Constitution, as under 
Ithe Confederation. 
IK [2.] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
Iwhich shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
Imade, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
lUnited States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
^Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Jjconstitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary n o t w i t -
hstanding. 
I (3.] The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, 
and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all 
executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and 
of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation to 
support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be 
required as a qualification to any Office or public Trust under 
the United States. 
ARTICLE VII 
[ADOPTION] 
[Ratification — Attestation.] 
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be 
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between 
the States so ratifying the same. Done in Convention by the 
unanimous consent of the states present the seventeenth day 
of September in the year of our Lord one thousand seven 
hundred and eighty seven, and of the independence of the 
United States of America the twelfth. In Witness Whereof we 
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In Convention Monday September 17th 1787. 
Present The States of 
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr. Hamilton 
from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary-
land, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia. 
Resolved, 
That the preceding Constitution be laid before the United 
States in Congress assembled, and that it is the Opinion of 
this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a 
Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the People 
thereof, under the Recommendation of its Legislature, for 
their Assent and Ratification; and that each Convention 
assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice 
thereof to the United States in Congress assembled. 
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, that as 
soon as the Conventions of nine States shall have ratified this 
Constitution, the United States in Congress assembled should 
fix a Day on which Electors should be appointed by the States 
which shall have ratified the same, and a day on which the 
Electors should assemble to vote for the President, and the 
Time and Place for commencing Proceedings under this Con-
stitution. That after such Publication the Electors, should be 
appointed, and the Senators and Representatives elected: 
That the Electors should meet on the Day fixed for the 
Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes 
certified, signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution 
requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress 
assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should 
convene at the Time and Place assigned; that the Senators 
should appoint a President of the Senate, for the sole Purpose 
of receiving, opening and counting the Votes for President; 
and, that after he shall be chosen, the Congress, together with 
the President, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this 
Constitution. 
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention. 
Go. WASHINGTON, Presidt. W JACKSON, Secretary. 
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS] 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVII 
577 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Amend. XVIII, § 1 
AMENDMENT XIII 
Section 
I [Slavery prohibited ] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment ] 
Section 1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction 
gee. 2. [Power to enforce amendment . ] 




1 [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection ] 
2 [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment ] 
3 [Disqualification to hold office ] 
4 [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confed-
eracy and claims not to be paid ] 
5 [Power to enforce amendment ] 
Section 1. [Cit izenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.? 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside No State shall 
taake or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
Immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws 
Sec. 2. [Representat ives — P o w e r to reduce appoint-
£ r ment . ] 
v Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed But when the right to vote at any election for the choice 
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judi-
%oal Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, 
Jteing twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
^States, or m any way abridged, except for participation in 
I 'wlhon, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
\*nall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
i * ^ e citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
' ^ enty-one years of age in such State 
£ * * , % IDisqu&H&cation to hold office.} 
fpNo person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, 
jjf Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
L?J" or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
|F?o> having previously taken an oath, as a member of Con-
K ^ s > or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
filfly State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
R e s t a t e , to support the Constitution of the United States, 
I S ? " "ave engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the 
P * » ° r given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof But 
Rvjpess may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove 
E r ^ d i s a b i h t y 
fegT [Public debt not to be quest ioned — Debts of 
W+frt the Confederacy and c la ims not to be paid.] 
E g * ^ validity of the public debt of the United States, autho-
K & Dv law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions 
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel-
lion, shall not be questioned But neither the United States 
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave, 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal 
and void 
Sec . 5. [Power to enforce amendment . ] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section 
1 [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to disqualify ] 
2 [Power to enforce amendment ] 
Sect ion 1. [Right of c i t izens to vote — Race or color 
not to disqualify.] 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment . ] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation 
AMENDMENT XVI 
( income tax.] 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on 
Incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportion-
ment among the several States, and without regard to any 
Census or enumeration 
AMENDMENT XVII 
(Elect ion of senators . ] 
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six 
Vears, and each Senator shall have one vote The electors in 
^ach State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors 
Of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures 
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State 
Ui the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue 
Writs of election to fill such vacancies Provided, That the 
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to 
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacan-
cies by election as the legislature may direct 
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the 
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid 
as par t of the Constitution 
AMENDMENT XVIII 
[REPEALED DECEMBER 5, 1933 SEE AMENDMENT 
XXI, SECTION 11 
Section 
1 [National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors ] 
2 [Concurrent power to enforce amendment ] 
3 [Time limit for adoption ] 
Sect ion 1. [National prohibit ion — Intoxicat ing li-
quors.] 
After one year from the ratification of this article the 
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors 
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
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PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people 
of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of 
'free government, do ordain and establish th is CONSTITU. 
HON. 189$ 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
4. [Religious l iberty — No property qualification to vote o*-
hold office.] 
5. [Habeas corpus.] 
6. [Right to bear arms.] 
7. [Due process of law.] 
8. [Offenses bailable.] 
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
10. [Trial by jury.] 
II- [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
*12. [Rights of accused persons J 
*3. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.] 
*4. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of war-. 
rant.] 
*«. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
*6- [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
*7. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
io ^ t t a m d e r — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.] 
* j - (Treason defined — Proof.] 
*J- [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
**• [Slavery forbidden.] 
."*• [Private property for public use.] 
* j - [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
**• [Uniform operation of laws.] 
if?' [Rights retained by people.] 
Section 
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
27. [Fundamenta l rights.] 
28. [Declaration of the r ights of crime victims.] 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of their con-
sciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of th^t 
right. i8&e 
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free 
governments a re founded on their authori ty for their equ^l 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to al ter or 
reform thei r government as the public welfare may require. 
18&6 
Sec . 3 . [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
The Sta te of U t a h is an inseparable par t of the Federal 
Union and the Constitution of the United Sta tes is the 
supreme law of the land. 18&6 
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification 
to vote or hold office.] 
The r ights of conscience shall never be infringed. The S t a t e 
shall m a k e no law respecting an establ ishment of religion o r 
prohibit ing the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall b e 
required as a qualification for any office of public t rus t or for 
any vote a t any election; nor shall any person be incompetent 
as a witness or ju ror on account of religious belief or t h e 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and S t a t ^ 
nor shall any church dominate the S ta te or interfere with i t s 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated 
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction., 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No 
property qualification shall be required of any person to v o t ^ 
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. I89e 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not b^ 
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public 
safety requires it. i89g 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms foj-
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or t h e 
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not b^ 
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature 
from defining the lawful use of arms. 1984 (2nd s.sx> 
Sec. 7. fDue process o f faw. J 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or proper ty 
wi thout due process of law. 189ft 
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable 
except: 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there ifc 
subs tan t ia l evidence to support the charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation o r 
parole, or while free on bail await ing tr ial on a previous 
felony charge, when there is substant ia l evidence t<3 
suppor t the new felony charge; or 
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designate!! 
by s t a tu t e as one for which bail may be denied, if there ifc 
581 
Art. I, § 9 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person 
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law. 1988 (2nd s.s.) 
Sec . 9. [Excess ive ba i l a n d fines — C r u e l p u n i s h -
men t s . ] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 1896 
Sec . 10. [Trial b y ju ry . ] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event 
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. 1996 
Sec . 11. [ C o u r t s o p e n — R e d r e s s of in jur ies . ] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party. 1896 
Sec . 12. [R igh t s of a c c u s e d pe r sons . ] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
na ture and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute 
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by s ta tute or rule. 1994 
Sec . 13. [ P r o s e c u t i o n b y i n f o r m a t i o n o r i n d i c t m e n t — 
G r a n d jury . ] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commit-
ment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec . 14. [ U n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s fo rb idden -*J*iL 
a n c e of w a r r a n t . ] ^ JgHJ 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons 1 ^ ; 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 8eii»i 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but "tin 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particSS 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thin* 
be seized. v f ? ? 
v# 
Sec . 15. [ F r e e d o m of s p e e c h a n d of t h e p r e s s •—TXJjvt 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel ti 
t ru th may be given in evidence to the jury; and if iVrfj* 
appear to the jury tha t the matter charged as libelous^ tru 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable end 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have thej to 
to determine the law and the fact. - U ^ 
Sec . 16. [No i m p r i s o n m e n t for d e b t — Exception.] I 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases* 
absconding debtors. .r/JSJ 
Sec . 17. [E lec t ions t o b e f ree — So ld i e r s voting.] ~JT 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or militar. 
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of th 
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at tht 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations W b 
prescribed by law. /Jim 
«v 
j * 
Sec . 18. [ A t t a i n d e r — E x p o s t f ac to l a w s — Impairiai 
c o n t r a c t s . ]
 t ^X 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing thf 
obligation of contracts shall be passed.
 rjm 
Sec . 19. [T reason def ined — Proof . ] ^ 
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war 
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid 
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. 18W 
M Sec. 20. [Mi l i ta ry s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e civil power.] \% 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the cry*1 
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered u» 
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war 
except in a manner to be prescribed by law. M* 
Sec . 2 1 . [S lave ry fo rb idden . ] ££ 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within this State. V 
H Sec . 22. [ P r i v a t e p r o p e r t y for p u b l i c use.] *> 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without jus t compensation. £ 7 
u\ 
Sec. 2 3 . [ I r r e v o c a b l e f r a n c h i s e s fo rb idden . ]
 # ** 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, 
privilege or immunity. 
Sec . 24. [Uni form o p e r a t i o n of laws . ] . *#<' 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operatio^r 
i s ^ 
Sec . 25 . [R igh t s r e t a i n e d b y peop le . ] L 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to i^PJjjJ 
or deny others retained by the people. ^ 
Sec . 26. [ P r o v i s i o n s m a n d a t o r y a n d p r o h i b i t o 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory •*•«, 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared t0 **-
otherwise. "* 
Art. VII, § 9 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 588 
(4) If the governor disapproves any bill or item of appro-
priation after the adjournment sine die of any session of the 
Legislature, the presiding officer of each house shall poll the 
members of tha t house on the mat ter of reconvening the 
Legislature. If two-thirds of the members of each house are in 
favor of reconvening, the Legislature shall be convened in a 
session that shall begin within 60 days after the adjournment 
of the session at which the disapproved bill or item of appro-
priation passed. This session may not exceed five calendar 
days and shall be convened at a time set jointly by the 
presiding officer of each house solely for the purpose of 
reconsidering the bill or item of appropriation disapproved. If 
upon reconsideration, the bill or item of appropriation again 
passes both houses of the Legislature by a yea and nay vote of 
two-thirds of the members elected to each house, the bill shall 
become law or the item of appropriation shall take effect on 
the original effective date of the law or item of appropriation. 
1992 
Sec. 9. [Governor may nil certa in vacancies . ] 
When any State or district office shall become vacant, and 
no mode is provided by the Constitution and laws for filling 
such vacancy, the Governor shall have the power to fill the 
same by granting a commission, which shall expire at the next 
election, and upon qualification of the person elected to such 
office. 1896 
Sec. 10. [Governor's appoint ive p o w e r — Vacancies . ] 
The Governor shall nominate, and by and with consent of 
the Senate, appoint all State and district officers whose offices 
are established by this Constitution, or which may be created 
by law, and whose appointment or election is not otherwise 
provided for. If, during the recess of the Senate, a vacancy 
occurs in any State or district office, the Governor shall 
appoint some qualified person to discharge the duties thereof 
until the next meeting of the Senate, when the Governor shall 
nominate some person to fill such office. If the office of 
Lieutenant Governor, State Auditor, State Treasurer or Attor-
ney General be vacated by death, resignation or otherwise, it 
shall be the duty of the Governor to fill the same by appoint-
ment, from the same political party of the removed person; 
and the appointee shall hold office until a successor shall be 
elected and qualified, as provided by law. 1979 
Sec. 11. [Vacancy in office of Governor — Determina-
t ion of disability.] 
In case of the death of the Governor, impeachment, removal 
from office, resignation, or disability to discharge the duties of 
the office, or in case of a Governor-elect who fails to take office, 
the powers and duties of the Governor shall devolve upon the 
Lieutenant Governor until the disability ceases or until the 
next general election, when the vacancy shall be filled by 
election. If, during a vacancy in the office of Governor, the 
Lieutenant Governor resigns, dies, is removed, or becomes 
incapable of performing the duties of the office, the President 
of the Senate shall act as Governor until the vacancy is filled 
or disability ceases. If in this case the President of the Senate 
resigns, dies, is removed, or becomes incapable of performing 
the duties of the office, the Speaker of the House shall act as 
Governor until the vacancy is filled or disability ceases. While 
performing the duties of the Governor as provided in this 
section, the Lieutenant Governor, the President of the Senate, 
or the Speaker of the House, as the case may be, shall be 
entitled to the salary and emoluments of the Governor, except 
in cases of temporary disability. 
The disability of the Governor or person acting as Governor 
shall be determined by either a written declaration transmit-
ted to the Supreme Court by the Governor stat ing an inability 
to discharge the powers and duties of the office or by a 
majority of the Supreme Court on joint request of the Presi-
dent of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Represen-
tatives. Such determination shall be final and conclusive. 
Thereafter, when the Governor t ransmits to the Supreme 
Court a written declaration tha t no disability exists, the 
Governor shall resume the powers and duties of the office 
unless the Supreme Court, upon joint request of the President 
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives, or upon its own initiative, determines that the Governor 
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office. The 
Lieutenant Governor shall then continue to discharge these 
powers and duties as acting Governor. The Supreme Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions arising under 
this section. 1979 
Sec. 12. [Board of Pardons and Paro le—Appointment 
— P o w e r s and procedures — Governor's pow-
ers and dut ies — Legislature's powers . ] 
(1) There is created a Board of Pardons and Parole. The 
Governor shall appoint the members of the board with the 
consent of the Senate. The terms of office shall be as provided 
by statute. 
(2) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole, by majority vote 
and upon other conditions as provided by statute, may 
grant parole, remit fines, forfeitures and restitution or-
ders, commute punishments, and grant pardons after 
convictions, in all cases except treason and impeach-
ments, subject to regulations as provided by statute. 
(b) A fine, forfeiture, or restitution order may not be 
remitted and a commutation, parole, or pardon may not 
be granted except after a full hearing before the board, in 
open session, and after previous notice of the time and 
place of the hearing has been given. 
(c) The proceedings and decisions of the board, the 
reasons therefor in each case, and the dissent of any 
member who may disagree shall be recorded and filed as 
provided by statute with all papers used upon the hear-
ing. 
(3) (a) The Governor may grant respites or reprieves in all 
cases of convictions for offenses against the state except 
treason or conviction on impeachment. These respites or 
reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the 
board. At that session, the board shall continue or deter-
mine the respite or reprieve, commute the punishment, or 
pardon the offense as provided in this section. 
(b) In case of conviction for treason, the Governor may 
suspend execution of the sentence until the case is re-
ported to the Legislature at its next annual general 
session, when the Legislature shall pardon or commute 
the sentence, or direct its execution. If the Legislature 
takes no action on the case before adjournment of that 
session, the sentence shall be executed. 1992 
Sec. 13. [Repealed.] 1992 
Sec. 14. [Duties of L ieutenant Governor.] 
The Lieutenant Governor shall: 
(1) serve on all boards and commissions in lieu of the 
Governor whenever so designated by the Governor; 
(2) perform such duties as may be delegated by the 
Governor; and 
(3) perform other duties as may be provided by statute. 
1992 
Sec. 15. [Duties of State Auditor and State Treasurer.] 
(1) The State Auditor shall perform financial post audits of 
public accounts except as otherwise provided by this Consti-
tution. 
(2) The State Treasurer shall be the custodian of public 
moneys. 
(3) Each shall perform other duties as provided by statute. 
1992 
Rule 104 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
* 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any 
other or further statement which shows the character of the 
evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, 
and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in 
question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be 
conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmis-
sible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, 
such as making statements or offers of proof or asking ques-
tions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) P la in error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking 
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although 
they were not brought to the attention of the court. 
Rule 104. Prel iminary quest ions . 
(a) Quest ions of admiss ibi l i ty generally. Preliminary 
questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a 
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of 
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the 
provisions of Subdivision (b). In making its determination it is 
not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to 
(privileges. 
\ (b) R e l e v a n c y condi t ioned on fact . When the relevancy 
^bf evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, 
the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of 
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the 
condition. 
(c) Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admissibility of 
confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of the hearing of 
the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so 
conducted when the interests of justice require, or when an 
accused is a witness and so requests. 
(d) Testimony b y accused . The accused does not, by 
testifying upon a preliminary matter, become subject to cross-
examination as to other issues in the case. 
(e) Weight and credibility. This rule does not limit the 
right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant 
to weight or credibility. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 105. Limited admissibil ity. 
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one 
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another 
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the 
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly. 
Rule 106. Remainder of or related wri t ings or re-
corded s tatements . 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is 
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the 
introduction at tha t time of any other part or any other 
writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be 
considered contemporaneously with it. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
ARTICLE II. JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
Rule 201. Judic ia l not ice of adjudicat ive facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of 
adjudicative facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not 
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally 
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or 
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, 
whether requested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if 
requested by a party and supplied with the necessary infor-
mation. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled u^ 
timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to tJ 
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the n ^ 
noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the r e q u e s t j 
be made after judicial notice has been taken. 
(f) Time of taking not ice . Judicial notice may be taken J 
any stage of the proceeding. 
(g) Instruct ing jury. In a civil action or proceeding K 
court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive anvtJ any^ judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall insftJ 
the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as concha! 
any fact judicially noticed. 
ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTIONS. 
Rule 301. Presumpt ions in general in civi l actions > J 
proceedings . 
(a) Effect. In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwM 
provided for by statute or by these rules, a presumptj 
imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burdend 
proving tha t the nonexistence of the presumed fact is mcrg 
probable than its existence. 
(b) Inconsis tent presumpt ions . If presumptions are ly 
consistent, the presumption applies tha t is founded upo* 
weightier considerations of policy. If considerations of p o S 
are of equal weight neither presumption applies. 
Rule 302. Applicabil i ty of federal law in civil actioM 
and proceedings . 
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumptjp 
respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense tt 
to which federal law supplies the rule of decision is detfjr-
mined in accordance with federal law. 
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY 
AND ITS LIMITS. 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendencyfl 
make the existence of any fact tha t is of consequence to ti* 
determination of the action more probable or less probaNfe 
than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant ev idence general ly a d m i s s i b l e ^ 
relevant ev idence inadmiss ible . '''•/:-?ffg 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otHei*Bj 
provided by the Constitution of the United States o ^ 
Constitution of the state of Utah, s tatute, or by these rule 
by other rules applicable in courts of this state. EVK 
which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclus ion of re levant ev idence on grow 
prejudice, confus ion, or w a s t e of t i m e ^ 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its P*??S 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger ortfj 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, f 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or ne 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404. Character e v i d e n c e not admissible i9<lj§| 
conduct; except ions; other crimes* U/9 
(a) Character ev idence generally. Evidence of a J 
character or a trai t of character is not admissible^ 
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith 00^3 
ticular occasion, except: --^tn 
(1) Character of accused . Evidence of a # g j l 
t rai t of character offered by an accused, or bv t^EJ 
ecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of v ict im. Evidence of a VeT**^f 
of character of the victim of the crime offered^ 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
